

1 Introduction

Dams necessarily interrupt the natural flow regime of rivers to generate their economic gains, causing environmental and potentially social disruption in the area of inundation and downstream (WCD, 2000; Renofalt et al., 2010; McCully, 2001). Traditionally economic approaches are used to suggest efficient water allocation and management policies (Wilson and Carpenter, 1999; Birol et al., 2006; Wimpenny, 1994). Concerns have been raised regarding the ability of economics (Sagoff, 2008, 2011; Steele, 2009; Paton and Bryant, 2012; Abson and Termansen, 2011) and cost benefit analysis tools such as “willingness to pay” (Sagoff, 2000) to assign value to non-market ecosystem goods and services or ensure their sustainability.

Many of the world’s rural poor rely on ecosystem services provided by environmental resources. Their vulnerability increases and prospects for economic development reduce with degradation of these resources (Malley et al., 2007; Juana et al., 2012; McCully, 2001). Water and poverty are linked (GWP, 2003); increases in access to irrigation for example, can improve circumstances of economically marginalised groups (Lipton and Litchfield, 2003). Storing water for distribution via engineered infrastructure increases access for those served but may reduce access for users downstream of the storage. “Re-operating” existing dams can increase water available to the rural poor and maintain or improve their ecosystem services at little or no cost to other stakeholders (Richter and Thomas, 2007; Watts et al., 2010; Konrad et al., 2012).

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (GWP, 2000) is the ideal for addressing complex interactions between water resource uses, incorporating social, economic and ecological goals. Merrey et al. (2005) propose IWRM could better support rural livelihoods by taking a broader perspective, developing interdisciplinary models which integrate physical as well as social variables. In some regions there is a strong water-energy-food security “nexus” implying these components must be managed as a system rather than in isolation (Granit et al., 2012). The exclusive search for water security (Grey and Sadoff, 2007), energy security (Yergin, 2006) or food security (Godfray

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et al., 2010) will cause difficulties where these systems are interlinked as progress in one may stifle the others. Achieving “security” across these sectors requires understanding the trade-offs and synergies between them.

At the limits of a water resource system’s utilisation, further gains of one benefit can only result from sacrifice of another. Quantified relationships between these gains and sacrifices are known as Pareto-optimal trade-offs (Cohon, 1978). They can be represented graphically by curves (2-D) or surfaces (3-D) – accepted tools of water management (Loucks et al., 2005). Understanding the form of trade-offs between 4 or more objectives (regarded as “many” objectives, Fleming et al., 2005) can alter decision makers’ preferences and avoid the selection of “extreme” management policies which can result from considering smaller numbers of objectives (i.e. ignoring real system complexity) (Kollat et al., 2011). Opportunities can be revealed to achieve win-wins where all parties benefit, or large gains for little or no sacrifice (Hurford et al., 2013).

Where classical multi-objective optimisation (Cohon, 1978; Yeh, 1985) struggles to define trade-off relationships with complex forms or between more than two objectives (Shukla et al., 2005), the most advanced multi-objective evolutionary optimisation algorithms (MOEAs) can simultaneously and reliably define trade-offs between 10 or more objectives (Reed et al., 2013). Classical optimisation requires a priori preferences or weights to be declared for the different objectives so that multiple runs must be carried out with varying weights to define a trade-off curve; this is only practical for a small number of objectives. After a single run, MOEAs allow decision makers to assess a posteriori the relative gains and sacrifices associated with a certain decision or set of decisions before selecting a balance between them (Coello et al., 2007). MOEAs can be coupled to external simulators representing complex non-linear systems, such as those already used by stakeholders to plan their own system. They generate discrete solutions which approximate the continuous Pareto-optimal curve or surface. Non-commensurate (e.g. non-monetary) objectives can be optimised, meaning stakeholder-specific benefit functions can be developed without direct reference to monetary value and optimised alongside traditional economic objectives.

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Several authors (e.g. Kasprzyk et al., 2009; Kollat and Reed, 2007) have demonstrated the use of visual analytics for analysis of trade-offs revealed by MOEA optimisation of water resources problems. Non-optimised information can be added to enhance understanding of the optimised policy implications for different stakeholders. Large datasets (1000's of points) can be analysed in a time-efficient manner facilitating more informed decision-making (Kollat and Reed, 2007; Lotov, 2007)

This paper contributes a many-objective visual trade-off analysis for the multi-reservoir hydropower system known as the Seven Forks project on the Tana River in Kenya. Volume dependent reservoir release curves are optimised for eight objectives covering municipal water provision, ecosystem services, and revenues from hydropower and irrigated agriculture. Introduction of proposed irrigation schemes in the Tana's delta provides a novel approach to investigating the impacts of different investment decisions – by assessing their impact on Pareto-optimal trade-offs.

The case study is outlined in the next section, followed by a description of the methodology before results are presented and discussed then conclusions are drawn.

2 Case study

The Tana is Kenya's longest river and most significant hydropower resource (Fig. 1). The river experiences flood peaks in May and November resulting from the long and short rain seasons respectively.

Currently the five hydropower plants of the Seven Forks project in the Tana basin provide around 70 % of Kenya's electricity. Three plants are associated with storage dams – Masinga, Kiamburu and Kiambere. The other two (Gitaru and Kindaruma) are run-of-river plants with pondages upstream of their dams. Masinga and Kiambere reservoirs also provide water for irrigation and municipal demands. The dams have disrupted the flow regime of the river by augmenting low flows, reducing peak flows and reducing the number of days riparian land is flooded (Maingi and Marsh, 2002). Richter et al. (1996) discuss the importance of hydrological factors in maintaining ecological function.

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The Tana River Delta was recently classified as a protected wetland (Ramsar, 2012), requiring consideration of the sustainability of management practices in terms of both the local ecosystems and livelihoods. This wetland has specific requirements for flow variability which amounts to a major demand for water. In the dry season the delta provides high quality grazing land for large numbers of pastoralists constituting a high value ecosystem service (Davies, 2007).

Protected high biodiversity riverine forests upstream of the delta are home to endemic and endangered species of primates (Karere et al., 2004) and rely on regular floods (Hughes, 1990) and low flows (Kinnaird, 1992) to maintain ecosystem health. Documented flow changes will have a negative impact on these forests (Maingi and Marsh, 2002). The natural variability of flows historically replenished nutrients on riparian agricultural lands and in the delta. Sediments deposited lead to beneficial morphological change. These ecosystem services are under threat from alteration of the flow regime (Emerton, 2005; Leauthaud et al., 2013).

Several large irrigation schemes are planned for the Tana Delta including 20 000 ha of sugar cane, 16 500 ha of cotton and 21 600 ha of irrigated rice. If implemented these schemes could threaten current social and ecological functions of the delta and potentially decrease its value as a tourism resource (Mireri et al., 2008).

3 Methodology

A multi-criteria search (optimisation) algorithm is linked to a water resource management simulator of the basin, to define a set of discrete solutions approximating the Pareto-optimal set. The approach is initially used to reveal trade-offs for the current system (no new irrigation schemes). In a second case new irrigation water demands are introduced to investigate their impact on trade-offs. This will demonstrate how adding irrigation investments impacts the trade-offs that map the social-economic-ecological and engineering performance of the system. Visual analytic plots are built to help understand the trade-offs for each case. This section first describes the features of the

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Firm energy production is added to the trade-off surface through sizing of the spheres. Larger spheres indicate higher firm energy levels. Hydropower revenue is represented by a colour range applied to the spheres (Fig. 5).

In this and subsequent figures trade-off surfaces are simplified by controlling the resolution at which solutions are displayed. As this reduces the number of solutions shown, decision makers would be asked to choose a preferred region of the surface before all Pareto-optimal points are reintroduced for investigation of detailed solutions. As objectives (dimensions) are added to the surface, the number of solutions included in it increases. An objective's poorest performance can decline further as it is traded off against additional objectives. Maximum flow alteration is increased to 135 in Fig. 5 to accommodate the new surface.

Firm energy trades off against flood peak objectives as it increases when flood water is stored to secure generation during drier periods. It also trades off against the flow alteration objective as relatively constant release provides higher firm energy than natural variability.

Between Policy D and E (Fig. 5) there is a trend for increasing hydropower revenue as flow becomes more natural but flood peaks reduce. Exceptions to this trend result from the limited scope for upstream dam operations to increase revenue without impacting on the flow related objective values controlled by Kiambere – the last hydraulic structure in the system.

Flow alteration is decreased from Policy D to E by releasing water to maintain low flows rather than high flows (Fig. 6). This increases the proportion of flows released through the turbines of the Kiambere hydropower plant because they don't exceed its flow capacity; thereby increasing revenue. The flow duration curve from Policy E departs from the natural curve at the turbine capacity of the Kiambere plant as additional release beyond this magnitude generates no additional revenue.

Policy F brings around 10% more flow duration within the productive capacity of the Kiambere turbines than Policy E. In addition some of the high flow volume made

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available is released to increase the lowest flows above the natural level (Fig. 6). This more constant flow achieves higher firm energy generation (Fig. 7).

Agricultural revenue is added to the trade-off surface by converting spheres to cones whose orientations indicate its magnitude (Fig. 8). Cones pointing down indicate the lowest revenues; cones pointing up show high revenues. Maximum flow alteration is increased to 195 to accommodate the new surface.

High agricultural revenue depends on both reliable supply (storage) and release rates at the Masinga and Kiambere reservoirs. Storage levels alone are not a predictor of agricultural revenue as without operating rules allowing releases, crops cannot be irrigated. Agricultural revenue trades off against reduction of flood peaks and alteration of the flow regime which can increase storage levels. There is also a trade-off with hydropower revenue, which benefits from some storage but requires higher releases which impact on storage. The maximum mean annual revenue achieved by the optimisation represents no reduction from the maximum possible annual revenue, i.e. there are no irrigation deficits.

4.2 Proposed demands case – implementing irrigation schemes in the delta

Having identified the trade-offs in the system under current water demands, we now compare them with the Pareto set involving a supplemental decision: “what proportions of the proposed irrigation schemes to implement?”. Figure 9 shows the trade-off surface combining both cases to highlight the region associated with the introduction of potential irrigation investments. Maximum flow alteration is increased to 1072 and maximum agricultural revenue increased to USD 285 M.

Figure 10 shows the trade-offs between the same metrics as Fig. 8; this shows how ecological flow characteristics trade-off with increased agricultural revenues. New irrigation can lead to a more altered regime.

In the current demands case agricultural revenue could be increased without irrigation development in the delta by reducing the long flood peak magnitude. With the new delta irrigation schemes, the short flood peak is further reduced to provide further

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


Fig. 1. Tana River basin schematic. Inset map shows the location of river and catchment within Kenya.

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


Fig. 2. Reservoir release rule (hedging) curves as represented by the IRAS-2010 model. Each patterned pair of opposing arrows represents an optimisation decision variable. Point D is the dead storage of the reservoir. Point A represents the controlled release when the reservoir is full. B and C points can be varied in two dimensions for hedging. In total 5 decision variables define each reservoir's release rule.

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


Fig. 5. The same trade-off surface as Fig. 3 with firm energy added using sphere size and hydropower revenue shown with colour. Larger spheres indicate higher firm energy; blue spheres mean high revenues. Three policies (D, E, F) illustrate trends across the surface. Moving from D to E, hydropower revenue increases as flood peaks are reduced but flow regime alteration becomes less pronounced. From E to F long flood peaks are increased as a result of higher storage levels increasing uncontrolled releases and flow regime alteration is increased to conserve water for firm energy generation.

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


Fig. 6. Comparison of the natural flow duration curve with those resulting from the 3 selected policies of Fig. 5. Lower flows are increased by sacrificing higher flows as we move across the trade-off surface in Fig. 5 from Policy D to E. This results in 79% higher hydropower revenue. The Policy E curve departs from the natural curve at the turbine flow (i.e. productive) capacity of the Kiambere plant. Policy F brings around 10% more flows within the productive capacity at Kiambere than Policy E and increases low flows above the natural regime.

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


Fig. 7. Energy generation implications of the three policies labelled in Fig. 5. Firm energy is the level of generation which can be provided with 90 % reliability. Policy F best sustains energy generation to achieve firm energy 326 % higher than Policy D and 37 % higher than Policy E.

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


Fig. 8. The same trade-off surface as Fig. 5 with cones replacing spheres. Their orientation shows agriculture revenue from lowest (pointing down) to highest (pointing up). Agriculture revenues trade-off against flood peak objectives and correlate with firm energy, except at the highest agricultural revenues, where there is a trade-off.

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


Fig. 9. Trade-off surface of the combined current and proposed demands cases (blue cones show system performance when irrigation schemes can be expanded). Some proposed demands solutions dominate the current demands solutions reducing their representation on the surface. This figure shows how trade-offs achievable by the best system operating rules change once irrigation investments are considered.

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


Fig. 10. The same trade-off surface as Fig. 8 but with different extents of irrigation scheme implementation. Maximum agricultural revenue more than doubles but maximum flow alteration increases by 5.5 times. Increased agricultural revenue correlates with greater disturbance of the natural water environment. A 3-D animation of this plot is available in online Supplement.

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


Fig. 11. 3-D (non-trade-off) plot showing the relationship between irrigation scheme selection and agricultural revenue. The solution points are the same as those shown in Fig. 10. High revenues can be achieved with or without the implementation of the cotton scheme. A high proportion of all other schemes must be implemented to achieve maximum revenue however.

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


Fig. 12. The same trade-off surface as Fig. 10 but restricted to reservoir rules which result in no municipal deficits considering historical data. Such “brushing” of trade-off plots allow stakeholders to focus on system designs that interest them. Three policies are selected for discussion. A 3-D animation of this plot is available in online Supplement.

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