

## **Reviewer #2**

*We thank the reviewer for comments to help improve this manuscript.*

This paper presents a social-hydrological model on the links between farmers' land use decisions and flood consequences at a basin scale, which is a novel effort in this field. The research question, methods and data are well introduced, and the results are valuable. I recommend to consider this paper for publish after minor revisions.

A few detailed comments are listed here, which are hopefully helpful for improvement of the paper.

Page 4, line 87-90, the authors listed literature of ABM on water issues, but the references are quite old from the years of 2003-2011 and only one from 2017. In addition, there is a lack of reference about ABM in flood studies. I suppose it would be valuable if the authors read some recent papers:

- Aerts, J.C.J.H., Botzen, W.J., Clarke, K.C. et al. Integrating human behaviour dynamics into flood disaster risk assessment. *Nature Clim Change* 8,193–199 (2018)
- Liang E. Yang, Jürgen Scheffran, et al., 2018. Assessment of Flood Losses with Household Responses: Agent-based Simulation in an Urban Catchment Area. *Environmental Modelling and Assessment*, 2018, 23(4):369-388
- Ahmed Mustafa, et al., 2018. Effects of spatial planning on future flood risks in urban environments. *Journal of Environmental Management*, Volume 225, 1 November 2018, Pages 193-204
- Omar S. Areu-Rangel, et al., 2019. Impact of Urban Growth and Changes in Land Use on River Flood Hazard in Villahermosa, Tabasco (Mexico). *Water* 2019, 11(2), 304

**ABMs have been used in a variety of fields within hydrology. We list studies that are more closely related to the agriculture field, but realize that including some citations that use ABMs for studying floods would be good. Thus, we have modified lines 97 to include a part that mentions ABM use for flood studies.**

Page 4-5, line 94-102, there are already many research about land use changes impacts on stream flow, what's the new value added by the present study?

**Line 103-105: The reviewer is correct in that there is a large body of research examining historical changes in streamflow from land use and climate change. However, the purpose of this study is not to investigate changes in streamflow that arise from land use. Rather, this study attempts to highlight the use of socio-hydrology and Agent-Based modeling for surface water hydrologic investigations. We are trying to show that hydrologic changes in the system can potentially be tied to external economic variables and characteristics of the population (i.e. farmers in this case) residing in that watershed.**

Line 137, it would be more accurate to say “a group of farmer agents and city agents”. Is there only one city agent?

**Line 147-148: There is only one city agent, but there are 100 farmer agents in the current simulations. We have corrected this line to say “a group of farmer agents”.**

ABM proceed with monthly time steps. Hydrological model proceeds with hourly timestep. How are they integrated?

**The hydrologic model proceeds in hourly timesteps because it needs to be able to simulate a flood discharge event. Most flood events in the Midwest U.S are associated with intense rainfall, thus it is critical to simulate those events on a fine scale. Every year, the city agent then computes the flood damage based on the maximum discharge event for that year. The farmer agents may change their land use on an annual basis (in the spring before the growing season). When land use changes occur, CN values are updated within the hydrology module. Those are the two main integrations between the hydrology and the agent modules. The above is described in detail in section 2.2.**

Section 2.4.2, Line 255-257, why is it assumed that most farmers rent lands for crop production? Do they rent yearly, or how long usually is their land rent contract? I am not sure, but I assume many farmers own lands in the US.

**Line 272-274: Majority of the land in the Midwest, particularly in the CornBelt (Eastern Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana) is rented, according to the latest Tenure, Ownership, and Transition of Agricultural Land Survey published by the USDA:**

**[https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015/TOTAL\\_Highlights.pdf](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015/TOTAL_Highlights.pdf)**

**In fact, 80.6% of the land is rented in Iowa (i.e. non-operator landlords):**

**<https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c2-78.html>**

**The rental contracts are on an annual basis. Average rental rates for Iowa over the last few years have been around \$220-240/acre (\$543-592/hectare).**

Nice to see the many historical data in Figure 3. Are these data used as input in the ABM, and how?

**All of the input data in section 2.4 are used as input into the model. Corn prices, crop production costs, land rental values (cash rent), and federal government subsidies are used by the farmers for calculating crop revenue. Section 2.7.2 of the manuscript and particularly section S4 of the supplement describe how these inputs are used.**

**The city agent bases the conservation subsidies on the land rental values.**

Equation 1, yield is the Arithmetic function of year, precipitation and temperature. I may not understand this correctly. How could you add year, precipitation and temperature together? They don't even have the same unit. How would you explain the equation, e.g.  $2200 \text{ MT/ha} = 2005 \text{ year} + 160\text{mm} + 35^\circ\text{C}$ ?

**This equation is actually a multiple regression between temperature, precipitation, and yield for the years 1960-2006). Thus, it's not like a physical equation (e.g. bernoulli's equation, darcy's law, etc) where the units have to work out. The variable containing year**

$(\beta_1(\text{year}_t))$  accounts for the increase in yields through time. This increase is not based on better climate, but rather better farming techniques, better corn hybrids (improved seed genetics), fertilizer application, etc. However, for that variable, since the regression starts at 1960, you have to subtract  $\text{year}_t$  from 1960. So for year 2005 for instance, it'll actually be 45 (2005-1960).

Section 2,7,1, taking conservation option means farmers have to plant native prairie strips. Did the authors consider the costs of planting the prairie strips? How much is it less than planting crops?

**Yes, the farmer agents do consider the cost of planting native prairie. Section S4 of the supplement describes how the cost of native prairie strips is incorporated into the farmer agent revenue calculation. Section S1.2 describes in detail the actual cost of native prairie strips, which include establishment costs, continual maintenance costs, and opportunity costs (cost of forgone revenue from the land taken out of crop production). The cost of planting crops is significantly higher than the cost of planting prairie. For example, in 2010, the cost of planting prairie was ~\$216/acre for high quality land (e.g. land that produces the highest crop yields) versus ~\$422/acre from crops (not including land rent). However, with crops, farmers can make significantly more money than they would from conservation subsidies. So in 2010, the farmers had a net revenue of ~ +10\$/acre from crops versus a net revenue of ~ -\$11/acre from prairie. Some years, the net revenue from crops may be -\$40/acre to -\$70/acre (i.e. a loss), where as other years that net revenue may be +\$150/acre. Of course, all of these numbers vary from farmer to farmer based on quality of land, which influences the cash rental rate, and other stochastic variability.**

How did you quantify the many " $\delta C$ "s in equation 2? There is only one introduction of calculating  $\delta C_{\text{profit}:X}$  (equation 4).

**At the request of the editor, we moved a significant portion to the supplementary material to make the manuscript more readable. Where needed, we point the reader to the supplement. For instance, line 452 points to supplement section S4 for a more detailed description of how  $\text{Profit}_{\text{diff}}$  is computed. The only difference between  $\delta C_{\text{profit}:X}$  and  $\delta C_{\text{futures}:Y}$  is the use of realized crop prices versus the use of projected future crop prices. Both variables use the same set of equations.**

**We modified lines 460-485 to provide more detail for the profit function. We also moved figure 4 from the supplement back to the main manuscript to describe the profit function in more detail. Where needed, we point the reader to the supplement for further information.**

The major finding of the study indicates that peak discharge is most sensitive to changes in crop prices. As we know generally crop price is a market effect and is not controllable by the farmer and city agents in the basin scale. Thus three questions:

1. Would you say that crop price in the US or in the globe influences water discharge (flood) in the Squaw Creek basin?

2. Does it mean that local efforts in the basin have little effects regarding flood control?
3. What would you suggest for decision making of flood management in the Squaw Creek basin, based on your research findings?

**We thank the reviewer for these insightful questions. We know that local decisions influence the local land use, which along with other physical characteristics of the landscape, ultimately influence discharge outcomes. Our model demonstrates that external factors can also influence local streamflow, albeit in a complex and unpredictable way as the information gets filtered through the complex decision making of local farmers. Social factors (local or external) introduce significant uncertainty in local hydrology outcomes, and by ignoring them, water management plans will be inherently incomplete. Thus, we recommend that multi-scale human factors be explicitly considered when assessing the sustainability of long-term management plans. Some of this description was added to the conclusions lines 808-814.**

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**Linking economic and social factors to peak flows in an agricultural watershed using socio-hydrologic modeling**

David Dziubanski<sup>1</sup>, Kristie J. Franz<sup>1</sup>, William Gutowski<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Geological and Atmospheric Sciences, Iowa State University, Ames, IA

*Correspondence to:*  
David Dziubanski  
2027 Agronomy Hall  
Iowa State University  
Ames, IA 50011  
[dave.dziubanski@gmail.com](mailto:dave.dziubanski@gmail.com)

29 **Abstract:** Hydrologic modeling studies most often represent humans through predefined actions  
30 and fail to account for human responses under changing hydrologic conditions. By treating both  
31 human and hydrologic systems as co-evolving, we build a socio-hydrological model that  
32 combines an agent-based model (ABM) with a semi-distributed hydrologic model. The curve  
33 number method is used to clearly illustrate the impacts of landcover changes resulting from  
34 decisions made by two different agent types. Aiming to reduce flooding, a city agent pays farmer  
35 agents to convert land into conservation. Farmer agents decide how to allocate land between  
36 conservation and production based on factors related to profits, past land use, and willingness.  
37 The model is implemented for a watershed representative of the mixed agricultural/small urban  
38 area land use found in Iowa, USA. In this preliminary study, we simulate scenarios of crop  
39 yields, crop prices, and conservation subsidies along with varied farmer parameters that illustrate  
40 the effects of human system variables on peak discharges. High corn prices lead to a decrease in  
41 conservation land from historical levels; consequently, mean peak discharge increases by 6%,  
42 creating greater potential for downstream flooding within the watershed. However, when corn  
43 prices are low and the watershed is characterized by a conservation-minded farmer population,  
44 mean peak discharge is reduced by 3%. Overall, changes in mean peak discharge, which is  
45 representative of farmer land use decisions, are most sensitive to changes in crop prices as  
46 opposed to yields or conservation subsidies.

47

48

49

50

51

52 **1. Introduction**

53

54 Humans change the water cycle through actions that affect physical and chemical aspects  
55 of the landscape, and these changes occur from global to local scales and over varying time  
56 periods (Vorosmarty and Sahagian, 2000). Despite their significant impacts to the landscape,  
57 humans remain the most poorly represented variables in hydrologic models (Sivapalan et al.,  
58 2012). Land cover and land use are commonly treated as fixed in time in many hydrologic  
59 models through the use of static parameters. When made dynamic, landscape change is often  
60 limited to predefined scenarios that are developed without consideration of how economics, local  
61 culture, or climate may combine to influence land use decisions. For example, the field of  
62 integrated water resources management (IWRM), which attempts to explore the interactions  
63 between humans and water, typically uses “scenario-based” approaches (Savenije and Van der  
64 Zaag, 2008). While scenario-based studies allow quantification of the impacts of a management  
65 decision on the hydrologic system, there are significant limitations (Elshafei et al., 2014;  
66 Sivapalan et al., 2012). Human and environmental systems are highly coupled with feedbacks  
67 from one system creating stress on the other system, which in turn affects the behavior of the  
68 first system. Therefore, representing management decisions as pre-determined will not reproduce  
69 the real-world variability that may arise as a result of complex feedbacks between the human  
70 system and the physical system.

71 Arguments have emerged ~~for socio-hydrological~~in the hydrological sciences and Water  
72 Resources Systems Analysis (WRSa) fields for modeling in which humans and the environment  
73 are treated as co-evolving (e.g., Di Baldassarre et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2015; Montanari, 2015;  
74 Rosengrant et al., 2002; Sivapalan et al., 2012; Sivapalan and Blöschl, 2015; Wainwright, 2008).  
75 In this way, models can account for disturbances to natural systems by humans and

76 simultaneously assess physical processes and economic and social issues. In the hydrologic  
77 literature, two approaches have been used to simulate coupled human and natural systems: a  
78 classic top-down approach and a bottom-up approach using agent-based modeling (ABM). In the  
79 first approach, all aspects of the human system are represented through a set of parametrized  
80 differential equations (e.g., Di Baldassarre et al., 2013; Elshafei et al., 2014; Viglione et al.,  
81 2014). For example, Elshafei et al. (2014) characterizes the population dynamics, economics,  
82 and sensitivity of the human population to hydrologic change through differential equations to  
83 simulate the coupled dynamics of the human and hydrologic systems in an agricultural  
84 watershed. In contrast, the ABM approach consists of a set of algorithms that encapsulate the  
85 behaviors of agents and their interactions within a defined system, where agents can represent  
86 individuals, groups, companies, or countries (Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006; Borrill and  
87 Tesfatsion, 2011; Parunak et al., 1998). System agents can range from passive members with no  
88 cognitive function to individual and group decision-makers with sophisticated learning and  
89 communication capabilities. The ABM approach has several advantages over the traditional top  
90 down approach (Bonabeau, 2002). Agent-based models are able to capture emergent  
91 phenomenon that result from interactions between individual entities. In addition, simulating  
92 individual entities through ABM provides for a more natural description of a system in contrast  
93 to developing differential equations that capture the behavior of the system as a whole. ABMs  
94 also provide for greater modeling flexibility by allowing for different number of agents, various  
95 degrees of agent complexity, and behavioral differences among the agents. ABM has been used  
96 to study the influence of human decision making on hydrologic topics such as water balance and  
97 stream hydrology (Bithell and Brasington, 2009), flooding (Du et al., 2017; Jenkins et al., 2017;  
98 Yang et al., 2018), irrigation and water usage (Barreteau et al., 2004; Becu et al., 2003; Berger et

99 al., 2006; Berglund, 2015; van Oel et al., 2010; Schlüter and Pahl-wostl, 2007), water quality  
100 (Ng et al., 2011), and groundwater resources (Noel and Cai, 2017; Reeves and Zellner, 2010).

101 A dominating topic in the hydrologic sciences that can be studied through use of ABMs  
102 is the issue of land use change impacts on hydrologic flows in intensively managed agricultural  
103 landscapes (Rogger et al., 2017). A number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of  
104 land use change on streamflow (Ahn and Merwade, 2014; Frans et al., 2013; Naik and Jay, 2011;  
105 Schilling et al., 2010; Tomer and Schilling, 2009; Wang and Hejazi, 2011) Ahn and Merwade  
106 (2014) is one such study that found that 85% of streamflow stations in Georgia indicated a  
107 significant human impact on streamflow. Another study by Schilling et al., (2010) indicated a  
108 32% increase in the runoff ratio in the Upper Mississippi River basin due to land use changes,  
109 mainly due to increases in soybean acreage. Results of Wang and Hejazi (2011) are consistent  
110 with Schilling et al., (2010). They found a clear spatial pattern of increased human impact on  
111 mean annual stream over the Midwestern states due to increases in cropland area.

112 Given clear evidence that the human system has a significant effect on streamflow, we use a  
113 social-hydrologic modeling approach to better understand the effects of land-use changes driven  
114 by economic and human behavior on hydrologic responses, which would be otherwise difficult  
115 to observe with a hydrologic model alone.

116 In this study, we develop a social-hydrologic model that simulates changes in conservation  
117 land area over time within an agriculturally-dominated watershed as a function of dynamic  
118 human and natural factors. Using a sensitivity analysis approach, we use this model to quantify  
119 the impact of economic and human factors on land use changes relating to conservation  
120 implementation and subsequently, how these land use changes impact the hydrologic system. We  
121 explore the following research questions:

- 122 1) To what degree do economic and agronomic factors (specifically crop prices,  
123 conservation incentives, and crop yields) impact the success of a conservation  
124 program designed to reduce peak flows?
- 125 2) To what degree are hydrologic outcomes sensitive to various factors that commonly  
126 influence agricultural land use decisions?

127 Using simulations of a historical 47 year period, we explore land use and hydrologic outcomes  
128 for a typical agricultural watershed in Iowa under the following six scenarios developed from  
129 economic data: crop yields 11% above and below historical values, corn prices 19% above and  
130 below historical values, and conservation subsidy rates 27% above and below historical cash rent  
131 values. Additionally, we simulate land use and hydrologic outcomes for the historical period  
132 without any perturbations to these economic data for comparison purposes. The following model  
133 methodology is described using the ODD (Overview, Design Concepts, and Details) protocol  
134 developed by Grimm et al. (2006).

## 135 **2. Model Purpose**


136  
137 The purpose of the model is to understand the impact of land use decisions by upstream  
138 farmers on flooding response in a downstream urban area under perturbations to extrinsic  
139 economic and natural factors (e.g. crop prices, land rental values, climate), as well as intrinsic  
140 factors (e.g. internal farmer behavior, local government incentives). System behavior under  
141 changes in extrinsic and intrinsic factors is analyzed using a scenario-based ensemble approach.

### 142 **2.1 State Variables and Scales**

143  
144 The model links an agent-based model of human decision making with a rainfall-runoff  
145 model to simulate social and natural processes within highly-managed agricultural watersheds  
146

147 (Figure 1). The agent-based model consists of two types of agents: a group of farmer agents and  
 148 a city agent.

149 The primary modeling domain consists of the watershed and the subbasins located within  
 150 the watershed. The model user must define the subbasins based on external analyses of  
 151 hydrologic flows and conditions. Each subbasin is populated by one or more farmer agents as  
 152 specified by the user. A farmer agent modifies the land use of the subbasin in proportion to the  
 153 subbasin area assigned to that agent. The most downstream subbasin in the watershed is  
 154 populated by an urban center, which is represented by a city agent. The city agent impacts land  
 155 use by providing subsidies to upstream farmer agents to change his/her land management.



156

Figure 1. Flow of information within the agent-based model.

157

### 2.1.1 Farmer agent state variables

158

159

160 The primary state variable for a farmer agent is the conservation parameter ( $Cons_{max}$ ),  
161 which characterizes the degree to which a farmer agent is “production-minded” versus  
162 “conservation-minded”. This concept is based on McGuire et al. (2013) who identified that  
163 US cornbelt farmers tend to fall along a spectrum from purely productivist to purely  
164 conservationist.  $Cons_{max}$  is randomly assigned to each farmer agent upon initialization and  
165 provides variation in farmer agent behavior based on how an individual agent may prefer to  
166 balance maximizing crop yields versus protecting the environment.  $Cons_{max}$  represents the  
167 maximum fraction of land a farmer is willing to put into conservation. The minimum value is  
168 0.0, in which case a farmer is purely production-minded and is unwilling to convert any  
169 production land into conservation. We set the maximum value at 10% ( $Cons_{max} = 0.10$ ) based  
170 on the conservation practice used in this study (Section 2.7.1). Therefore, a farmer is purely  
171 conservation-minded at a parameter value of 0.1, and is willing to convert up to 10% of  
172 his/her production land into conservation. This range of values corresponds to the percentage  
173 of conservation land implemented over each of the last ten year for the entire state of Iowa  
174 (~5-6% conservation land) and the Central Iowa Agricultural District (~3-4% conservation  
175 land).

176 A secondary state variable of importance to the farmer agent is risk aversion attitude  
177 (Prokopy et al., 2019). Risk aversion can be defined as the willingness to change land use  
178 under uncertainty. Farmers with a high risk aversion are unwilling to change their land use  
179 because they are trying to avoid risk. Keeping their land use consistent represents a more  
180 predictable payoff, even if the revenue may not be as great as another land use choice.  
181 Farmers that are more risk tolerant however, are more likely to adopt new practices such as  
182 conservation.

183 Farmer agents are further characterized by their decision-making preferences, which  
184 describe the relative importance that farmer agents place on different decision variables when  
185 adjusting their land use. The farmer agent decision characteristics are described in Sect. 2.7.2.

186 Each farmer agent is assigned state variables characterizing the percent of different soil  
187 types associated with the farmer's land. Corn crop productivity and crop production costs  
188 (including the land rental value) vary for each soil type. Thus, the soil types associated with a  
189 farmer agent's land impact his/her revenue.

### 190 **2.1.2 City Agent State Variables**


191 The city agent is characterized by a conservation goal that defines the amount of acres of  
192 conservation land desired. The purpose of the conservation land is to reduce flooding in the city,  
193 and the conservation goal changes from year-to-year depending on prior hydrologic events. The  
194 damage that the city agent incurs from a flood event is defined by a flood damage function. A  
195 parameter,  $ConsGoal_{max}$ , in the agent model defines how responsive the city agent is to prior  
196 hydrologic outcomes and determines by how much the city agent will change the conservation  
197 goal after experiencing a flood event (Section 2.8)

## 198 199 **2.2 Model Overview and Scheduling**

200  
201 Each year, the agent-based model proceeds through monthly time steps to simulate the  
202 relevant decision making. The hydrologic module proceeds in shorter hourly time steps to  
203 capture flood discharge events associated with rainfall events. Figure 2 depicts the decision-  
204 scheduling within the agent-based model. In January, the farmer agent calculates his/her  
205 preferred land division between production and conservation based on their risk aversion  
206 attitude, conservation-mindedness, newly acquired information about the global market (crop

207 prices, crop production costs, and crop insurance), conservation subsidies provided by the city  
208 agent, as well as recent farm performance (profits and yields) (Figure 2, purple box).

209 In February, the city agent contacts farmer agents in random order to establish new  
210 conservation contracts if an unmet conservation goal remains or to renew any expiring contracts  
211 (Figure 2, yellow box). If the farmer agent wants to add additional conservation acreage, a new  
212 contract is established for a 10 year period. The contract length is based on the Conservation  
213 Reserve Program (CRP), which is a program administered by the Farm Service Agency that  
214 promotes removal of environmentally-sensitive land from agricultural production in exchange  
215 for an annual subsidy payment. However, if the farmer agent wants fewer conservation hectares,  
216 expiring contracts are renewed for a smaller number of hectares or are ended. The farmer is  
217 obligated to fulfill any contracts that have not yet expired (i.e. contracts less than 10 years old).  
218 Any new acreage that has been established in conservation in addition to currently active  
219 contracts is subtracted from the city agent's conservation goal that was established in January.  
220 The city agent contacts as many farmer agents as needed until the conservation goal is reached.  
221 If there are not enough farmer agents willing to enter into conservation contracts and the  
222 conservation goal is not reached, the goal rolls into the next year. Because the farmer agents'  
223 land use decisions change on a yearly basis, it may be possible for the city agent to establish  
224 further contracts in the next year and fulfill the conservation goal.



225

Figure 2. Timeline of agent decisions and actions within the agent-based model.

226 Prior to May, the farmer agent establishes any newly contracted conservation land on the  
 227 historically poorest yielding land. The farmer agent makes no further decisions during May  
 228 through August (Figure 2). The city agent continuously keeps track of any flooding that occurs  
 229 during the May-August period (when the maximum discharge is assumed to occur) (Figure 2,  
 230 orange box). The associated flood damage cost is calculated in September and used to calculate  
 231 whether any further conservation land should be added (Figure 2, green box). If no flooding  
 232 occurred, the conservation goal remains unchanged. In October, the farmer agent harvests his/her  
 233 crop and calculates yields and profits for that year (Figure 2, blue box).

234 **2.3 Design Concepts**

235  
236 **Emergence:** Patterns in total conservation land and flood magnitude arise over time, depending  
237 on a number of variables. Agent decision-making parameters and behavioral characteristics (e.g.  
238 conservation-mindedness) influence the total acreage in conservation land, which in turn affects  
239 the magnitude of floods through changes in runoff productivity of the landscape.

240 **Objectives and Adaptation:** The ~~objective-goal~~ of the city agent is to reduce flood damage in  
241 the city. The city agent attempts to meet this ~~objective-goal~~ through an incentive program in  
242 which farmer agents are paid to convert production land to a conservation practice that will  
243 reduce runoff. If the city agent incurs a large cost from flooding in a given year, the city agent  
244 adjusts his/her “conservation goal” upward in order to ~~reduce minimize~~-future flood damage  
245 from events of similar magnitude. The objective of the farmer agent is to balance ~~a-maximization~~  
246 ~~of~~ profits with conservation and risk-aversion attitude. The farmer agents incrementally adjust  
247 their land use on an annual basis by taking into account profit variables, risk-aversion, and  
248 conservation-mindedness.

249 **Stochasticity:** Adjustments and stochastic variability are added to key agricultural variables,  
250 which include crop yields, production costs, cash rent values, and opportunity costs associated  
251 with conservation land in order to account for economic and environmental randomness within  
252 the system (Supplement S1.1, S1.2, S2). Random factors for these variables are drawn from  
253 uniform continuous distributions that are based on field data of crop yields, empirical survey  
254 data, and estimates published by Iowa State University Extension and Outreach. Changes in  
255 these distributions are also accounted for, depending on crop price levels.

256 **Learning:** As will be outlined further in Sect. 2.7.2, each year, the farmer agents calculate profit  
257 differences between crop production and conservation subsidies. Farmer agents save this profit

258 difference information from the beginning of the simulation and use it to adjust their decision-  
259 making space on an annual basis. The profit difference information is based on past crop prices,  
260 production costs, and conservation subsidies.

## 261 **2.4 Model Input**

262

### 263 **2.4.1 Economic Inputs**

264

265 Inputs to the agent-based models are historical crop prices (\$/MT), production costs  
266 (\$/Ha), cash rental rates (\$/Ha), and federal government subsidy estimates (\$/Ha). An example of  
267 these model inputs is shown in Fig. 3 in comparison to mean Iowa crop yields.


### 268 **2.4.2 Production Costs**

269

270 Production costs are treated as a time series input, with total costs per hectare for each  
271 year represented by one lumped value. Production costs used in this model application include  
272 machinery, labor, crop seed, chemicals, and crop insurance (Plastina, 2017). In addition, it is  
273 assumed that all farmer agents rent their land, which significantly increases expenses as land  
274 rental costs account for approximately half of total production costs (Plastina, 2017).

### 275 **2.4.3 Conservation Subsidy and Costs**

276 The conservation subsidy is based on the CRP Contour Grass Strips practice (CP-15A)  
277 which includes annual land rental payments and 90% cost share for site preparation and  
278 establishment (USDA Conservation Reserve Program Practice CP-15A, 2011). Subsidies are  
279 calculated using annual inputs of historical cash rental rates. The cost of establishing and  
280 maintaining conservation land is based on analysis conducted by Tyndall et al., (2013). These  
281 costs are adjusted based on the land quality of each farmer agent (Supplement S1.2).



282

Figure 3. Example input time series of corn price, production cost, and cash rent as compared to mean crop yields.

283

#### 2.4.4 Federal Government Subsidies

284

Calculation of federal government crop subsidies for individual farmer agents were not

285

included in the agent-based model due to the complexity and variety of commodity programs

286

available to US farmers, each of which focuses on different aspects of revenue protection (e.g.,

287

protection against low crop prices, protection against revenue loss). Rather, federal crop

288

subsidies are an input to the model and applied equally to each farmer agent. In this study, crop

289 subsidy inputs are based on historical estimates produced by Iowa State University Agricultural  
290 Extension (Hofstrand, 2018).

#### 291 **2.4.5 Environmental Variables**

292 The hydrology module requires hourly liquid precipitation (mm) as an input to simulate  
293 discharge from short-term heavy rainfall events. The crop yield module requires inputs of mean  
294 monthly precipitation and temperature to estimate crop yields (Section 2.6). The module  
295 calculates mean monthly precipitation based on the hourly precipitation input, however, the user  
296 must provide an input of mean monthly temperatures (C).

#### 297 **2.5 Hydrology Module**

298 A model structure that is designed to simulate peak flows was chosen for the hydrology  
299 module. Because the city agent in this model is impacted only by the maximum annual peak  
300 flow, precisely simulating the full time series of hydrologic flows as well as hydrologic  
301 components such as groundwater flow and evapotranspiration were not needed to meet the  
302 objectives of the current study. The modeling structure was designed based on a version of the  
303 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Hydrologic Engineering Center Hydrologic Modeling System  
304 (HEC-HMS) (Scharffenberg, 2013) used by the City of Ames, Iowa for flood forecasting in the  
305 Squaw Creek watershed in central Iowa. The Squaw Creek watershed represents the type of  
306 rural-urban conditions of interest for this study, and is a useful test-bed for this modeling  
307 application (Section 3). Further, calibrated parameters were available for the Squaw Creek  
308 watershed (Schmieg et al., 2011), providing a realistic baseline for the hydrology module.

309 Using the configuration and parameters previously defined by Schmieg et al. (2011) for  
310 the Squaw Creek watershed, the model on average was within 12.7% of the observed peak  
311 discharge for 12 major events simulated. Six of these events were simulated within 3-8% of the

312 observation, while the least satisfactory simulation overestimated the observed peak discharge by  
313 33%. This error was most likely due to the high spatial variability of precipitation for that event.  
314 For the two most recent record flooding events that have occurred, the model underestimated the  
315 peak discharge by 6.2% (2008, observed:  $356.7 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$ , simulated:  $334.6 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$ ) and 16.6% (2010,  
316 observed:  $634.3 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$ , simulated  $528.3 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$ ), showing that the model is able to simulate the  
317 flooding events needed to run scenarios within the ABM with a fair degree of accuracy. The  
318 HEC-HMS model has also been successfully used for simulation of short term rainfall-runoff  
319 events and peak flow and flood analysis in other studies (Chu and Steinman, 2009; Cydzik and  
320 Hogue, 2009; Gyawali and Watkins, 2013; Halwatura and Najim, 2013; Knebl et al., 2005;  
321 Verma et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013).

322 In the module, basin runoff is computed using the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) curve  
323 number (CN) method, runoff is converted to basin outflow using the SCS unit hydrograph (SCS-  
324 UH) method, and channel flow is routed through reaches in the river network using the  
325 Muskingum method (Mays, 2011). A single area-weighted CN parameter is required for each  
326 subbasin and is the only hydrology module parameter that changes during the simulation if land  
327 cover changes. The SCS-UH method requires specification of subbasin area, time lag, and model  
328 timestep. The Muskingum method is based on the continuity equation and a discharge-storage  
329 relationship which characterizes the storage in a river reach through a combination of wedge and  
330 prism storage (Mays, 2011). The Muskingum method requires specification of three parameters  
331 for each reach within the river network: Muskingum X, Muskingum K, and the number of  
332 segments over which the method will be applied within the reach (Mays, 2011). Muskingum X  
333 describes the shape of the wedge storage within the reach whereas Muskingum K can be  
334 approximated as the travel time through the reach.

335 For the agricultural areas, empirically-derived CN values (Dziubanski et al., 2017) are  
336 used for native prairie strips; a CN = 82 is used for 100% row crop production; and a CN = 72  
337 is used for the conservation option implemented by the farmer agents. Urban areas are set to a  
338 CN = 90 which is derived from the standard lookup tables for residential areas with lot sizes  
339 of 0.051 hectares or less, soil group C (USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service,  
340 2004). Subbasin delineations and Muskingum parameters previously defined by Schmiege et al.  
341 (2011) are used.

342 The model accepts point-scale rainfall data (e.g., rain gauge data) and calculates mean areal  
343 precipitation using the Thiessen Polygon gauge weighting technique (Mays, 2011). The Thiessen  
344 weights are entered as parameters to the module. For the initial testing presented in this paper,  
345 uniform precipitation over the entire watershed was assumed.

346 Output from the hydrology module is discharge at the watershed outlet ( $\text{m}^3 \text{s}^{-1}$ ). The  
347 hydrology module is run continuously but is designed primarily for simulation of peak flows,  
348 which generally occur during the summer in the study region; therefore, for simplicity, a constant  
349 baseflow is assumed and snow is ignored. Runoff, river routing processes, and discharge are  
350 computed on a timestep identical to the input rainfall data. The model is run at an hourly  
351 timestep in this study, but is capable of running at a 30-minute timestep.

## 352 **2.6 Crop Yield Module**

353  
354 Crop yields are modeled with a multiple regression equation that takes into account  
355 monthly precipitation and temperature. The regression equation, which was developed using  
356 historical crop yield and meteorological data for Iowa from 1960-2006, can be represented as  
357 (Tannura et al., 2008):

$$\begin{aligned}
yield_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(year_t) + \beta_2(September\ through\ April\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_3(May\ precipitation) + \beta_4(June\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_5(June\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_6(July\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_7(July\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_8(August\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_9(August\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_{10}(May\ temperature) \\
& + \beta_{11}(June\ temperature) + \beta_{12}(July\ temperature) \\
& + \beta_{13}(August\ temperature) + \varepsilon_t
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

358 Mean error of the above regression for Iowa over the 1960-2016 period is -0.395 MT/ha,  
359 and mean absolute error is +0.542 MT/ha. An error correction factor of +0.395 MT/ha was added  
360 to the yield for each year to correct for this error. The above regression model is only appropriate  
361 for reproducing mean historical crop yields. Since each farmer's land can be composed of  
362 different soil types, adjustments are applied to the crop yield for each soil type to account for  
363 differences in soil productivity (Supplement S2).

## 364 **2.7 Farmer Agent Module**

### 365 **2.7.1 Conservation option**

366  
367  
368 The conservation option implemented by farmer agents is native prairie strips, a practice  
369 in which prairie vegetation is planted in multiple strips perpendicular to the primary flow  
370 direction upland of and/or at the farm plot outlet (Dziubanski et al., 2017; Helmers et al.,  
371 2012; Zhou et al., 2010). Either 10% or 20% of the total field size is converted into native  
372 prairie vegetation under this practice. Prairie strips have been shown to reduce runoff by an  
373 average of 37% (Hernandez-Santana et al., 2013), and have additional benefits of reducing  
374 nutrients (Zhou et al., 2014) and sediments (Helmers et al., 2012) in runoff. The greatest  
375 runoff reduction was realized under the 10% native prairie cover; therefore, the most  
376 conservation-minded farmers ( $Cons_{max} = 0.10$ ) in the model potentially convert up to 10% of  
377 their total land into native prairie.

### 378 **2.7.2 Farmer agent land use decision process**

379  
380 Agents within an ABM can be modeled using a variety of decision models with varying  
381 degrees of complexity. Rules governing agent decision-making need to realistically capture  
382 human behavior without creating an excessively complex model (An, 2012; Zenobia et al.,  
383 2009). An (2012) compiled a list of nine of the most common decision models used in agent-  
384 based modeling studies. Examples of a few of these include micro economic models, space  
385 theory based models, cognitive models, and heuristic models. In micro-economic models, agents  
386 are typically designed to determine optimal resource allocation or production plans such that  
387 profit is maximized and constraints are obeyed (Berger and Troost, 2014). Example studies using  
388 optimization include Becu et al. (2003), Ng et al. (2011), Schreinemachers and Berger (2011). In  
389 heuristic-based models, agents are set up to use “rules” to determine their final decision (Pahl-  
390 wostl and Ebenhöf, 2004; Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006). The “rules” are typically  
391 implemented using conditional statements (e.g. if-then). Example studies using heuristics include  
392 Barreteau et al. (2004), Le et al. (2010), Matthews (2006), van Oel et al. (2010).

393 We take a different approach from the aforementioned studies by modeling agent decision  
394 making using a nudging concept originating in the field of data assimilation (Asch et al., 2017).  
395 Agents nudge their decision based on outcomes (i.e. flood damage, farm profitability) from the  
396 previous year. Information relevant to an individual agent is mapped into the decision space  
397 through a weighting function that updates the previous year’s land use prior decision to create a  
398 new (posterior) decision for the current year. The approach used for both agents is different from  
399 optimization in that the agents are not trying to determine the best decision for each year. These  
400 types of agents behave based on the idea of “bounded rationality”. In this case, the rationality of  
401 the agents is limited by the complexity of the decision problem and their cognitive ability to  
402 process information about their environment (Simon, 1957). These agents try to find a

403 satisfactory solution for the current year, and are thus termed “satisficers” rather than optimizers  
 404 (Kulik and Baker, 2008).

405 At the start of each calendar year, a farmer agent decides how to allocate his/her land  
 406 between production and conservation based on five variables: risk-aversion, crop price  
 407 projections, past profits, conservation goal, and neighbor land decisions. These factors were  
 408 chosen based on numerous studies indicating profits, economic incentives, conservation beliefs,  
 409 beliefs in traditional practices, neighbor connections, and observable benefits to be the key  
 410 factors influencing on-farm decision making related to conservation adoption (Arbuckle et al.,  
 411 2013; Arbuckle, 2017; Burton, 2014; Daloğlu et al., 2014; Davis and Gillespie, 2007; Hoag et  
 412 al., 2012; Lambert et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2015; Nowak, 1992; Pfrimmer et al., 2017;  
 413 Prokopy et al., 2019; Ryan et al., 2003).

414 A farmer agent’s decision of the total amount of land to be allocated into conservation,  $C_t$  ,  
 415 for the current year  $t$  is:

$$D_t = W_{risk-averse}[C_{t-1:t-X}] + W_{futures}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{futures:Y}] + W_{profit}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{profit:X}] + W_{cons}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{cons}] + W_{neighbor}[C_{neighbor}] \quad (2)$$

416 where  $C_{t-1:t-X}$  is the mean total amount of land allocated to conservation during the previous  $X$   
 417 years,  $D_{t-1}$  is the prior conservation decision (total amount of land the farmer would have liked  
 418 to implement in conservation) in year  $t - 1$ ,  $\delta C_{futures:Y}$  is the decision based on crop price  
 419 projections for  $Y$  years into the future,  $\delta C_{profit:X}$  is the decision based on the mean past profit of  
 420 the previous  $X$  years,  $\delta C_{cons}$  is the decision based on the conservation goal of the farmer, and  
 421  $C_{neighbor}$  (Supplement S3) is the weighted mean conservation land of the farmer agent’s  
 422 neighbors (Table 1). A given farmer can make a certain random number of neighboring  
 423 connections with farmers that are located in the same subbasin (Supplement S3). The variable  $Y$

424 indicates that  $\Theta$  one farmer agent might consider his/her history of conservation land  
425 implemented over the last year, while another farmer agent might consider his/her conservation  
426 land implemented over the last 5 years. Similarly, the variable  $X$  indicates that one farmer agent  
427 might take into account future crop projections for the next 5 years, while another farmer agent  
428 might take into account crop projections for the next 10 years.

429 Decision weights alter how each of the five components factor into the farmer agent's  
430 decision:  $W_{risk-averse}$  reflects the unwillingness to change past land use,  $W_{futures}$  reflects the  
431 consideration of future price projections,  $W_{profit}$  reflects the consideration of past profits,  $W_{cons}$  is  
432 the agent's consideration of his/her conservation goal, and  $W_{neighbor}$  reflects the importance that  
433 the agent places on his neighbor's decision (Table 2). Upon initializing each farmer agent, values  
434 are allocated for each decision weight such that:

$$W_{risk-averse} + W_{futures} + W_{profit} + W_{cons} + W_{neighbor} = 1 \quad (3)$$

435 The above decision scheme allows for varying decision weights, thus one farmer's  
436 decision may be heavily weighted by future crop prices, whereas another farmer's decision may  
437 be heavily weighted by past profits. If majority of a farmer's decision is based on  $W_{risk-averse}$ ,  
438 then that farmer is less inclined to change his/her previous land use.

439 The decision components for past profit and future crop prices are based on a partial  
440 budgeting approach that compares land use alternatives. Under this budgeting approach, farmer  
441 agents take into account added and reduced income, as well as added and reduced costs from  
442 changing an acre of land from crop production to conservation (Tigner, 2006). The result from  
443 performing this budget indicates the net gain or loss in income that a farmer agent may incur if  
444 they make the land conversion.

445 The past profits decision is solely based on outcomes that have been fully realized for the  
446 previous  $X$  years. In this decision, the land allocated to conservation is based on the net amount  
447 of money that could have been earned per hectare of conservation land versus crop land and is  
448 calculated as:

$$\delta C_{profit:X} = [A * Profit_{diff}^2 + B * Profit_{diff} + C] \cdot Cons_{max} \cdot Hectares_{tot} \quad (4)$$

449 where  $Profit_{diff}$  is the difference in profit between a hectare of cropland and a hectare of  
450 conservation land (Table 1),  $Cons_{max}$  is the farmer agent's maximum conservation parameter,  
451  $Hectares_{tot}$  is the area of the agent's land. In the case of  $\delta C_{profit:X}$ ,  $Profit_{diff}$  is calculated  
452 using realized crop prices from previous years (Supplement S4). The future price decision  
453 variable,  $\delta C_{futures:Y}$ , is also calculated using the same form of Eq. (4). However,  $Profit_{diff}$  is  
454 calculated using projected crop prices for the  $Y$  upcoming growing seasons. These price  
455 projections are based on historical crop prices with an added adjustment calculated from  
456 historical errors in crop price forecasts produced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture  
457 (Supplement S5).




Figure 4. Example of percent conservation change for  $\delta C_{profit}$  and  $\delta C_{futures}$ . Gray curves indicate negative percent change (decrease conservation land), black curves indicate positive percent change (increase conservation land).

The first term in Eq. (4), ~~the is a~~ second-degree polynomial of form  $Ax^2 + Bx + C = y$ , is displayed in Fig. 4. At the start of each year, farmers may decide to alter their land use based on observed  $Profit_{diff}$  from harvests in previous years ( $\delta C_{profit:X}$ ) or calculated  $Profit_{diff}$  based on projected crop prices ( $\delta C_{futures:Y}$ ). If  $Profit_{diff}$  is positive (i.e. greater profit is earned from crop production than conservation land), the farmer agent will potentially decrease the amount of land in conservation (gray curve). Likewise, under negative  $Profit_{diff}$ , conservation land is potentially increased because revenue is lower from crop production (black curve). Half of the maximum allowable percent increase in conservation land is assumed to correspond to the median historical negative  $Profit_{diff}$ , whereas half of the maximum allowable percent decrease in conservation land corresponds to the median historical positive  $Profit_{diff}$  (Figure 4). We assume that farmer agents will not change land use when a very small profit difference between

471 the two possible options is observed because changing land use requires extra upfront time and  
 472 resources (Duffy, 2015). Similarly, we assume that farmer agents will fully implement the  
 473 maximum land conversion possible prior to reaching the most extreme  $Profit_{diff}$  values. Three  
 474 equations need to be simultaneously solved to determine coefficients  $A, B, C$  (Supplement S4).  
 475 The three equations are based on the 25th, median, and 75th percentiles of historical  $Profit_{diff}$   
 476 information. Thus, farmers are continually utilizing historical observations of  $Profit_{diff}$  to  
 477 formulate their decision space through time.

478 The use of a profit function (i.e. Eq. (4)) is meant to capture to effects of changes in crop  
 479 prices on conservation land. In 2008 and 2011, corn prices rose to a record high values, and  
 480 farmers in the Midwest U.S. (e.g., Iowa, Minnesota) were converting significant portions of CRP  
 481 land back into crop production (Marcotty, 2011; Secchi and Babcock, 2007). It is estimated that  
 482 when corn prices rise by \$1.00, 10-15% of CRP land in Iowa is converted back to production  
 483 (Secchi and Babcock, 2007). Eq. (4) captures this transition between adding and removing  
 484 conservation land based on crop price change, and it allows for variation in the decision-making  
 485 between farmer agents since variables such as crop production costs vary from farm to farm.

486 The total amount of agricultural land that a farmer converts to conservation in any given  
 487 year based on his/her conservation goal ( $\delta C_{cons}$ ) is defined by the Bernoulli distribution:

$$P(n) = p^n(1 - p)^{1-n} \quad n \in \{0,1\} \quad (5)$$

488 Here,  $p$  indicates the probability of fully implementing conservation land and  $1 - p$  indicates the  
 489 probability of not implementing any conservation land. The variable  $n$  is simply the support of  
 490 the distribution that labels a success of full implementation as 1 and a failure of full

491 implementation as 0. The probability  $p$  of fully implementing conservation land is a function of  
 492 the agent's  $Cons_{max}$  parameter and is computed by:

$$p = 10 \cdot Cons_{max} \quad (6)$$

493 The probability  $p$  scales from 0 at a  $Cons_{max}$  of 0, to 1 at a  $Cons_{max}$  of 0.1. Therefore, farmer  
 494 agents with a  $Cons_{max}$  of 0.05 and 0.1 will have a 50% and 100% probability of fully  
 495 implementing (10% of total agricultural land) conservation land in any given year based on their  
 496 conservation decision variable.

## 497 **2.8 City Agent Module**

498  
 499 At the end of each year, the city agent collects discharge data and calculates the damage  
 500 (Supplement S7) associated with the peak annual discharge at the watershed outlet for that year.  
 501 In February of the next year, the flood damage for the previous year  $t - 1$  is used to compute the  
 502 conservation goal of the city agent for the current year  $t$ .

503 The conservation goal of the city agent is calculated as:

$$G_t = G_{t-1} + (A_{tot} - C_{tot}) \cdot P \quad (7)$$

$$P = P_{new} \cdot FDam \quad (8)$$

504


$$P_{new} = \frac{ConsGoal_{max}}{FDmax} \quad (9)$$

505 where  $G_t$  is the conservation goal for the new year  $t$  (Table 1),  $G_{t-1}$  is the unfulfilled hectares in  
 506 conservation from the previous conservation goal for year  $t - 1$ ,  $A_{tot}$  is the total land area ~~in the~~  
 507 ~~catchment~~owned by the farmer agents,  $C_{tot}$  is the total number of hectares currently in  
 508 conservation,  $P$  is the percentage of new production land added into conservation,  $P_{new}$  indicates  
 509 how much land to add into conservation based on the flood damage  $FDam$  for year  $t - 1$ , and  
 510  $ConsGoal_{max}$  is a parameter that indicates the new percentage of conservation land to be added

511 if maximum flood damage occurs (Table 2). Currently,  $ConsGoal_{max}$  is set to 5% of total land  
512 area in the watershed when maximum damage occurs.

### 513 **3. Scenario Analysis**

514  
515 The study watershed is modeled after the Squaw Creek basin (~56200 Ha) located in  
516 central Iowa, USA (Figure 45). This basin is characterized by relatively flat hummocky  
517 topography and poorly drained soils with a high silt and clay content (~30-40% silt and clay)  
518 (Prior, 1991; USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS), 2015). The  
519 predominant land use is row crop agriculture (~70% of the total watershed area) with one major  
520 urban center at the outlet (Ames, Iowa), and several small communities upstream. Average  
521 annual precipitation is 32 inches (812 mm), with the heaviest precipitation falling during the  
522 months of May and June. The watershed is divided into 14 subbasins.



523

Figure 45. Squaw Creek watershed and subbasin division used in the hydrology module. Land cover data shown is from the National Land Cover Database (NLCD), 2016.

524 In this model application, 100 farmer agents are implemented (~7 farmers per subbasin)  
 525 with 121 hectares total for each farmer. The total acreage per farmer compares reasonably well  
 526 with average farm size for the state of Iowa in 2017, which was 140 hectares (USDA National  
 527 Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). Soil types and the area of land associated with each soil  
 528 type are randomly assigned to each farmer agent upon model initialization. Assigning different

529 soil types creates heterogeneous conditions under which farmer agents must operate (Supplement  
530 S2) and affects the profitability of each farmer agent differently.

531 Six scenarios are run: high and low yield ( $\pm 11\%$  from historical yield), high and low  
532 corn prices ( $\pm 19\%$  from historical prices) and high and low conservation subsidies ( $\pm 27\%$  from  
533 historical cash rent). The watershed was also simulated under historical conditions, in which no  
534 economic variables were changed, for comparison purposes. The above percentages were  
535 computed using trends and mean absolute deviations of historical economic data. For instance,  
536 based on the crop regression model (Section 2.6), crop yields display a relatively linear increase  
537 with time. The mean absolute deviation of crop yield was then computed using the linear time  
538 trend as a central tendency. The mean absolute deviation was determined to be 11%, thus the  
539 yield scenarios are  $\pm 11\%$  from the historical yield. The same approach was used for the crop  
540 price and conservation subsidy scenarios. A linear and cubic function were found to provide a  
541 good estimate of the central tendency of historical cash rent and crop prices, respectively, for  
542 those calculations. In addition, four different farmer decision schemes are created in which an  
543 80% weight was assigned to one decision variable, with all other variable weights set to 5%  
544 (Table 3). Each scenario is tested with each decision scheme and system outcomes under  
545 different farmer behaviors are assessed.

546 To test the sensitivity of the hydrologic system to farmer types, the conservation  
547 parameter ( $Cons_{max}$ ) of the farmer agents is varied using a stratified sampling approach. Each  
548 farmer agent is randomly assigned a  $Cons_{max}$  value from a predefined normal distribution:  
549  $(\overline{Cons_{max}}, \sigma_{Cons_{max}})$ . The lowest distribution is defined as  $\mathcal{N}(0.01, 0.01)$  and the highest  
550 distribution is defined as  $\mathcal{N}(0.09, 0.01)$ . Any farmer agent that is assigned a parameter value  
551 less than 0 or greater than 0.1 is modified to have a value of 0 or 0.1, respectively. Twelve

552 simulations are performed for each conservation parameter distribution, with a total of 17  
553 conservation parameter distributions. Thus, the first 12 simulations consist of farmer agents with  
554  $Cons_{max}$  chosen from  $\mathcal{N}(0.01, 0.01)$ . For the next 12 simulations, the mean  $Cons_{max}$  is shifted  
555 up by 0.05, with  $Cons_{max}$  chosen from  $\mathcal{N}(0.015, 0.01)$ . A total of 204 simulations are  
556 conducted for each decision scheme under each scenario (Table 3).

557 Each simulation is run using 47 years of historical climate and market data, with the  
558 exception of federal crop subsidies, which are based on 16 years of historical estimates produced  
559 by Iowa State University Agricultural Extension (Hofstrand, 2018; Table 4). It is assumed that  
560 federal crop subsidy payments from 1970-2000 are similar to levels seen from year 2000-2005  
561 due to relative stability in long-term crop prices and production costs. The hourly 47 year  
562 precipitation time series data was obtained from the Des Moines, Iowa airport Automated  
563 Surface Observing System. Historical 47 year time series of corn prices, crop production costs,  
564 and land rental values are used as economic inputs into the model and were obtained from Iowa  
565 State University Agricultural Extension and Illinois FarmDoc (Table 4).

#### 566 **4.5. Model Calibration and Validation**

567 Calibrating and validating the social part of social-hydrologic models is difficult due to  
568 reasons that include lack of sufficiently detailed empirical data or system complexity at various  
569 scales (An, 2012; Ormerod and Rosewell, 2009; Troy et al., 2015). Validation of agent-based  
570 models is usually performed on what are termed the micro and macro levels. The micro level  
571 involves comparing individual agent behaviors to real world empirical data whereas the macro  
572 level involves comparing the model's aggregate response to system-wide empirical data (An et  
573 al., 2005; Berger, 2001; Troy et al., 2015; Xiang et al., 2005). Troy et al., (2015) suggests that

574 one or a few model simulations out of an ensemble of simulations should match the real-world  
575 observed data.

576 We conduct an indirect macro-level model calibration for determining an appropriate  
577 range of farmer agent decision weights (Windrum et al., 2007). Since the subsidy program  
578 offered by the city agent is similar to the federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the  
579 model was developed and calibrated to attempt to reproduce the range and variability of  
580 conservation land seen in the CRP program. CRP data from 1986-2016 for the Central Iowa  
581 Agricultural District was used in the calibration process and two main objectives functions were  
582 used:

$$MAE = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |y_i - x_i|}{n} \quad (10)$$


$$Pearson's\ r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}} \quad (11)$$

584  
585 In the first step of calibration, the focus was to determine an appropriate range of mean  
586 *ConsMax* of the farmer agent population to match the magnitude of CRP land seen for central  
587 Iowa. The model was simulated 360 times using 20 random sets of farmer agent decision  
588 weights. Output from the first calibration step was filtered using a criteria of  $r > 0.6$  and  
589  $MAE < 25\%$ , and the optimal *ConsMax* range was reduced to 0.05-0.07. In the second step of  
590 calibration, the focus was to determine a singular optimal mean *ConsMax* value and narrow the  
591 range for each decision weight. *ConsMax* was incremented by 0.001 within the range derived  
592 from step 1, and 20 simulations were performed for each increment using decision weights  
593 stochastically drawn from the uniform distribution  $\mathcal{U}(0.05, 0.95)$  for a total of 400 simulations.  
594 Output was filtered using a stricter criteria of  $r > 0.7$  and  $MAE < 25\%$ . The final calibration

595 step involved 400 simulations with the optimal mean *ConsMax* value and stochastic sampling  
596 from the reduced range of decision weights derived in step 2. Filtering with a criteria of  $r > 0.75$   
597 and  $MAE < 12.5\%$  was performed to determine the final optimal decision weight ranges.

598 The optimal mean *ConsMax* value was determined to be 0.06 and the final optimal  
599 decision weight ranges were determined to be:  $W_{risk-averse} = (0.1, 0.43)$ ,  $W_{futures} =$   
600  $(0.07, 0.24)$ ,  $W_{profit} = (0.07, 0.34)$ ,  $W_{cons} = (0.18, 0.37)$ ,  $W_{neighbor} = (0.05, 0.35)$ . The  
601 median  $r$  and  $MAE$  values of the simulations after filtering with the criteria in step three ( $r >$   
602  $0.75$ ,  $MAE < 12.5\%$ ) were 0.79 and 11% respectively. Sixty-six out of 400 simulations matched  
603 this criteria in step three, whereas only seven matched this criteria in step one and 26 matched  
604 this criteria in step two.

605 The model simulated conservation land generally aligns with trends in the observed  
606 conservation land (Figure 106). Simulated conservation land is not maintained following a rise in  
607 crop prices in the mid-1990s and from 2006-2013, which is similar to the observed data (red).  
608 The drop in conservation land during these time periods occurs because the subsidy rate is not  
609 modified rapidly enough in comparison to market forces to incentivize the farmer (Newton,  
610 2017). ~~In 2008 and 2011, corn prices rose to a record high values, and farmer in the Midwest~~  
611 ~~U.S. (e.g., Iowa, Minnesota) were converting significant portions of CRP land back into crop~~  
612 ~~production (Marcotty, 2011; Secchi and Babeock, 2007). It is estimated that when corn prices~~  
613 ~~rise by \$1.00, 10-15% of CRP land in Iowa is converted back to production (Secchi and~~  
614 ~~Babeock, 2007).~~The model does capture the smaller decrease in conservation land between  
615 2007-2014, even though crop prices rose more dramatically than in the mid-1990s.



616

617 Figure 106. Simulated conservation land from four model simulations with Pearson's  $r > 0.8$  and  
 618  $MAE < 12.5\%$  in comparison to observed conservation land.  
 619

620 The onset of significant land conversion in the model is offset from the observations.  
 621 Conservation land is implemented in the mid-1970s, while conservation land in the observation  
 622 is implemented in the late-1980s. The CRP program did not come into existence until 1985,  
 623 which partly explains this difference. A large rise in conservation land to roughly 4% occurs  
 624 from 1975-1978, most likely due to a combination of decreasing crop prices from 1970-1974 and  
 625 model spin up. This is similar to the rate of rise in conservation land that occurred under the CRP  
 626 programs from 1985-1987 under a comparable period of decreasing crop prices.

627 Overall calibration does provide evidence that the model captures changes in CRP land  
 628 during the appropriate time periods. However, the calibration technique does have limitations.

629 ~~however, it does not provide evidence that any individual agent's decisions are valid.~~The  
630 technique followed here was an indirect calibration approach, whereby the parameters are  
631 determined based on the simulations that replicate the empirical data best (Fagiolo et al., 2006).  
632 This technique can lead to equifinality since difference parameter sets may reproduce the  
633 historical observations with similar degrees on accuracy. Further, this calibration approach does  
634 not provide evidence that any individual agent's decisions are valid. The stochastic nature of  
635 human behavior coupled with path dependencies makes it difficult to predict individual agent  
636 outcomes accurately (Berglund, 2015). In addition, it may be difficult to find sufficient data sets  
637 to support a robust validation at the micro-level. For modeling land use decisions, data is  
638 typically available at a larger scale such as county or state level rather than at the individual  
639 agent-level (e.g. single farm) (An, 2012; Parker et al., 2008). This introduces difficulty in trying  
640 to validate farm-level decisions with respect to farm-level finances (Section 2.7.2). Adding in  
641 additional factors, such as Federal Market Loss Assistance and Loan Deficiency Payments, as  
642 well as trying to characterize some of the other model parameters that were not a focus of this  
643 calibration, may further improve results.


644 In light of the paper by Windrum et al. (2007), there has been much debate as to the  
645 proper methodology and techniques to follow for ABM validation (Bharathy and Silverman,  
646 2013; Hahn, 2013). To fully validate the current model, a more extensive process may be  
647 necessary. Macal et al., (2007) introduced a framework for ABM validation that may provide for  
648 a more comprehensive evaluation. This framework includes subject matter expert evaluation,  
649 participatory simulation, model-to-model comparison, comparison against critical test cases,  
650 invalidation tests, and comprehensive testing of the entire agent strategy and parameter space.  
651 However, following this framework is very time costly, and thus most recent studies have

652 focused on empirical validation against real world macro level data, with some studies validating  
653 at the individual agent level if data is available (Fagiolo et al., 2019; Guerini and Moneta, 2017;  
654 Langevin et al., 2015; Schwarz and Ernst, 2009).

## 655 **45. Results**

### 656 **45.1 Crop Price Scenarios**

657 The 90<sup>th</sup> percentile peak discharge is 296.4 m<sup>3</sup>/s when no conservation is occurring in the  
658 watershed (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7). The 90<sup>th</sup> percentile peak discharge decreases for all four decision  
659 schemes and under all scenarios as the average conservation-mindedness ( $Cons_{max}$ ) of the  
660 population increases (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7). The low crop price scenario produces a larger decline in  
661 peak discharge compared to the high crop price scenario, with the exception of the conservation  
662 decision scheme (80% weight on conservation) in which both low and high crop price scenarios  
663 produce a similar ensemble pattern (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7a).




665

Figure 7. Mean 90th percentile discharge for high and low crop price scenarios under (a) 85% weight on conservation goal, (b) 85% weight on future price, (c) 85% weight on past profit, and (d) 85% weight on risk aversion. Bars indicate the median (circle) and the 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of discharge for all simulations at a specific  $Cons_{max}$ .

666 Under low crop prices, peak discharge reaches an average reduction of 8.18% ( $24.27 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ )  
 667 when the average  $Cons_{max}$  is 0.08-0.09 (conservation-minded population) and 4.67% ( $13.85$   
 668  $\text{m}^3/\text{s}$ ) when the average  $Cons_{max}$  is 0.04-0.06 (mixed population). The decrease in peak  
 669 discharge corresponds with the 800-1000 hectares and 400-600 hectares converted to  
 670 conservation by the conservation-minded and mixed farmer populations, respectively (Figure  
 671 8a, c, e, g). The production-minded populations ( $Cons_{max} \sim 0.01-0.02$ ) implement less  
 672 than 200 hectares during the entire simulation period. These acreage values represent 6.5-8.2%,  
 673 3.3-5.0%, and less than 2.0% of the entire watershed for the conservation-minded, mixed, and  
 674 production-minded groups, respectively. Given that 10% of the watershed would be in  
 675 conservation if native prairie strips were fully implemented, about 65-80% of a conservation-

676 minded population fully implements the practice over the simulation period under low crop  
677 prices.

678 Under the high crop prices, mean peak discharge decreases by 5.6 % (16.6 m<sup>3</sup>/s) under the  
679 future price weighting scheme and 2.9% (8.6 m<sup>3</sup>/s) under the past profit weighting schemes for  
680 the highly conservation-minded population (~~Figure 5~~[Figure 7](#)b and c, respectively), with an even  
681 smaller reduction seen for the risk-averse scenario. This represents approximately a 61% smaller  
682 decrease in the peak discharge when crop prices are high and the population is conservation-  
683 minded as compared to the low crop price scenario. Discharge remains largely unchanged for  
684 these decision schemes because generally less than 300 hectares of land is allocated for  
685 conservation when corn prices are high (~~Figure 6~~[Figure 8](#)d, f, and h). The small amount of  
686 conservation land implemented is due to farmer agents receiving significantly more revenue  
687 from crops than conservation subsidies. However, in the case of low crop prices, conservation  
688 subsidies allow the farmer agents to approach break even because they are guaranteed a subsidy  
689 that covers the cash rent for that land, whereas crop production leads to potential losses due to  
690 corn prices being low relative to production costs. Even in these scenarios where farmer agents  
691 are heavily considering profit related variables, populations dominated by production-minded  
692 farmer agents are still inclined to leave land in production (~~Figure 6~~[Figure 8](#)c and e).



693

**Figure 8.** Range of simulated conservation land within the watershed under low (left column) and high (right column) crop prices for conservation-minded populations (green), mixed populations (blue) and production-minded populations (red). Crop prices are plotted as bars for each crop price scenario. Results are for decision schemes of 85% weight on conservation behavior (a, b), 85% weight on future price (c, d), 85% weight on past profit (e, f), and 85% weight on risk aversion (g, h).

694

## 45.2 Crop Yield Scenarios

695

Under high and low crop yield scenarios, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile peak discharge decreases by an average of 5.9% (17.4 m<sup>3</sup>/s) and 7.6% (22.7 m<sup>3</sup>/s), respectively, for the conservation-minded

696

populations (Figure 7, Figure 9). Thus, a smaller decrease in peak discharge occurs with low crop

697

yields relative to low crop prices (Figure 5, Figure 7). In the low crop yield scenario, conservation

698

land was approximately 200 Ha less than in the low crop price scenario, particularly for the past

699

profit and future price decision schemes (Figure 6, Figure 8a, c, e, g and 8a10a, c, e, g).

700


Conversely, more conservation land is established under the high yield scenario compared to the

701


high crop price scenario (Figure 6, Figure 8b, d, f, h and 108b, d, f, h). As a result, mean peak

702

703 discharge decreases in the high yield scenario by 15.6% more compared to the high crop price  
 704 scenario for the conservation-minded population.



705 **Figure 9.** Mean 90th percentile discharge for high and low crop yield scenarios under (a) 85% weight on conservation goal, (b) 85% weight on future price, (c) 85% weight on past profit, and (d) 85% weight on risk aversion. Bars indicate the median (circle) and the 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of discharge for all simulations at a specific  $Cons_{max}$ .



**Figure 8** **Figure 10.** Range of simulated conservation land within the watershed under low (left column) and high (right column) crop yields for conservation-minded populations (green), mixed populations (blue) and production-minded populations (red). Yearly crop yields are plotted as bars for crop yield scenario. Results are for decision schemes of 85% weight on conservation behavior (a, b), 85% weight on future price (c, d), 85% weight on past profit (e, f), and 85% weight on risk aversion (g,h).

### 45.3 Conservation Subsidy Scenarios

706 Under the low and high subsidies scenarios (not shown), the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile peak  
 707 discharge decreases by an average of 5.8% (17.3 m<sup>3</sup>/s) and 7.6% (22.5 m<sup>3</sup>/s), respectively, for  
 708 conservation-minded populations. Similar to the low crop yield scenario, high subsidies do not  
 709 produce as large of a decrease in mean peak discharge as low crop prices (**Figure 5** **Figure 7**). In  
 710 the high subsidies scenario, conservation land was approximately 200-300 Ha less than in the  
 711 low crop price scenario, specifically for the future price and past profit decision scheme. In  
 712 comparison, low subsidies generate more conservation land than under high crop prices (**Figure**  
 713 **6** **Figure 8** b, d, f, h). As a result, mean peak discharge decreases in the low subsidy scenario by

714 14.8% more compared to the high crop price scenario for the conservation-minded population.  
715 Differences in peak discharge reduction between the high subsidy and low yield scenarios were  
716 insignificant, with less than 1% difference between these two scenarios.

#### 717 **4.5.4 Decision Schemes**

718 The future price and past profit decision schemes display the largest spread in discharge  
719 outcomes between scenarios (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7, 79). Mean peak discharge decreases on average  
720 by 9% (~27.2 m<sup>3</sup>/s) relative to when no conservation occurs for both decision schemes under all  
721 scenarios that encourage more conservation land (i.e. low crop prices, low yields, high subsidies)  
722 (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7b, c and ~~7b~~9b, c). Under scenarios that encourage less conservation land, mean  
723 peak discharge decreases by 5% (~15.4 m<sup>3</sup>/s). This spread in peak discharge results is not present  
724 under the risk-averse and conservation decision schemes.

725 The spread between the mean peak discharge under the different scenarios is smaller for  
726 the future price decision scheme (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7b and ~~7b~~9b) compared to the past profit  
727 decision schemes (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7c and ~~7e~~9c). This smaller spread may be due to uncertainty in  
728 future crop price projections. For instance, future crop price projections may underestimate high  
729 crop prices, but overestimate low crop prices, as is observed in previous USDA crop price  
730 forecasts (Supplement S5). Thus, the farmer agents may be making decisions based on a smaller  
731 range of crop prices when under the future price decisions compared to the past profit decision  
732 scheme where they use realized crop prices. In addition, the future crop price decision scheme  
733 results in greater variability in conservation land over short periods of time under all scenarios  
734 (~~Figure 6~~Figure 8c,d and ~~8e~~10c,d). This result is evident under the low crop price scenario, with  
735 several short periods showing changes in conservation land of 200-400 ha as compared to the

736 past profit scenario where conservation land remains relatively steady. However, this result does  
737 not lead to a larger spread (i.e. red and blue bars) within the mean peak discharge results.

738 The risk averse decision scheme produces the smallest changes in peak discharge under  
739 all scenarios, with an average decrease of less than 2% ( $6 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ ) and 3% ( $9 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ ) for mixed and  
740 conservation-minded populations, respectively (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7d, ~~7d~~9d). Because the farmer's  
741 past practices are the primary factor in determining land conversion in this scheme, the farmer  
742 agents implement a limited number of conservation acres ( $\leq 200 \text{ ha}$ ), regardless of the scenario.  
743 Therefore, changes in the economic variables are not having as large of an impact on the farmer  
744 agents when they are strongly risk-averse.


745 Overall, the current city agent conservation goal of 5% new conservation land at  
746 maximum flood damage did not have a significant impact on the total amount of land  
747 implemented. Following two major flooding events, the conservation goal of the city agent  
748 increases from less than 20 ha in 1975 to 620 ha in 1976. A similar event in 1977 increases the  
749 conservation goal by another 500 ha for a total goal of approximately 1100 ha. These increases  
750 correspond to the large and rapid onset of conservation land seen during those years (~~Figure~~  
751 ~~6~~Figure 8a, c, e; ~~8a~~10a, c, e). When the population has a high average  $Cons_{max}$ , the conservation  
752 goal of the city agent is nearly fulfilled during this period, particularly in the low crop price  
753 scenario. In these cases, 900 ha of the conservation goal is implemented, and 200 ha remains  
754 unimplemented. This results in the largest reduction in 90<sup>th</sup> percentile discharge under all  
755 scenarios and decision schemes (~~Figure 5~~Figure 7a, ~~7a~~9a). When the population has a low  
756 average  $Cons_{max}$ , the majority of the city agent's conservation goal remains unimplemented.  
757 Thus, the goal remains at a constant 1000-1200 ha and discharge remains unchanged. The only  
758 case where the city agent conservation goal limits the amount of land implemented is under the

759 conservation weighting scenario since conservation-minded farmers are inclined to add  
760 conservation land on a yearly basis.

## 761 **4.5.5 Historical Comparison**

762 To gain an understanding of how each of the scenarios differs from the historical 1970-  
763 2016 period, the mean peak discharge is compared against the historical scenario (Figure 11).  
764 Recall that under the historical scenario, farmer agents make annual land use decisions as in the  
765 other scenarios, but corn prices, conservation subsidies, and crop prices are unchanged from  
766 historical observed values. ~~, which does not modify any economic or agricultural variables~~  
767 ~~(Figure 9)~~. Overall, crop prices had the largest impact on mean peak discharge while changes in  
768 subsidies had the smallest overall impact. When crop prices were low, mean peak discharge  
769 decreased by 1-2% for mixed populations and 2-3% for conservation-minded populations under  
770 the future price and past profit schemes compared to the historical scenario ~~(Figure 9)~~ (Figure 11a).  
771 High crop prices result in an increase in peak discharge from the historical scenario, with an  
772 increase of 1-3% for mixed populations, and 3-5% for conservation-minded populations. This  
773 indicates that the farmer agents are more likely to convert land back to crop production under  
774 high crop prices than convert land to conservation under low crop prices, which is a similar  
775 conclusion to Claassen and Tegene, 1999.

776 The subsidy scenarios produced a similar pattern to the crop price scenarios, where a  
777 larger change (increase) in mean peak discharge occurs under low subsidies than under high  
778 subsidies ~~(Figure 9)~~ (Figure 11b). This pattern was not as clearly evident under the yield scenarios,  
779 with similar changes resulting from high and low yields ~~(Figure 9)~~ (Figure 11c).



780

Figure 9 Figure 11. Percent Change in median 90<sup>th</sup> percentile discharge from the historical scenario for (a) high and low crop prices, (b) high and low subsidies, (c) high and low yields for the conservation, risk, future price, and past profit weighting schemes.

781

782 **6. Conclusions**

783 Scenarios of historical and low crop yields, as well as high and low corn prices and  
 784 conservation subsidies, were simulated for an agricultural watershed in the Midwest US corn-

785 belt using an agent-based model of farmer decision making and a simple rainfall-runoff model.  
786 The influence of different farmer agent decision components on model outcomes was also  
787 explored. Model results demonstrate causations and correlations between human systems and  
788 hydrologic outcomes, uncertainties, and sensitivities (specifically focused on high flows).

789 The primary findings from this study are:

- 790 • Crop prices had the largest impact on mean peak discharge, with a 61% larger reduction in  
791 mean peak discharge under low crop prices in comparison to high crop prices.
- 792 • Changes in subsidy rates and crop yields produced a smaller impact on mean peak  
793 discharge. Only a 25-30% difference in mean peak discharge was realized between high and  
794 low subsidies, and high and low yields.
- 795 • Farmer agents more often made decisions to eliminate conservation land than to enter into  
796 conservation contracts: a 3-5% increase in mean peak discharge occurred under high crop  
797 prices, while only a 2-3% decrease in mean peak discharge occurred under low crop prices  
798 compared to the historical simulation. Thus, even under low crop prices, the effectiveness of  
799 the conservation program is limited either due to economic or behavioral factors.
- 800 • Hydrologic outcomes were most sensitive when farmer agents placed more weight on their  
801 future price or past profit decision variables and least sensitive when farmer agents were  
802 highly risk averse. For instance, under future price and past profit weighting scenarios, a 4%  
803 and 7% difference in mean peak discharge is seen between high and low crop prices as  
804 opposed to a 0-1% difference under the risk averse weighting scenario.

805

806 The ABM modeling approach demonstrated here can be used to advance fundamental  
807 understanding of the interactions of water resources systems and human societies, particularly

808 focusing on human adaptation under future climate change. Our model indicates that external  
809 factors can influence local streamflow, albeit in a complex and unpredictable way as the  
810 information gets filtered through the complex decision making of local farmers. Social factors,  
811 both local and external, introduce significant uncertainty in local hydrology outcomes, and by  
812 ignoring them, water management plans will be inherently incomplete. Thus, multi-scale human  
813 factors need to be explicitly considered when assessing the sustainability of long-term  
814 management plans.

815  
816 This study additionally demonstrates some of the advantages of the ABM approach. One  
817 of the primary advantages of ABMs is the ability to capture emergent phenomenon (Bonabeau,  
818 2002). For instance, in the model, the change in conservation area seen in the mid-1990s is larger  
819 than during the period after 2007, despite the much larger volatility in crop prices after 2007.  
820 While the primary reason behind this phenomenon may not be clear, the ABM captures this  
821 change. The ABM also allows for specifying small scale differences between farmer agents such  
822 as variations in conservation-mindedness, production costs, yields, cash rents, etc. Thus, using  
823 ABMs allows for a very flexible modelling approach.

824 The current model design contains limitations in both the hydrologic and agent-based  
825 models that should be addressed in future model development. The curve number values that  
826 were used to represent the conservation option were derived for small agricultural plots of  
827 approximately 0.5-3 Ha in size. The question remains whether these CN values can be scaled up  
828 to the size of a several hundred hectare farm plot and still produce reasonable discharge results.  
829 In addition, there is no explicit spatial representation of farmer agents within each subbasin,  
830 Coupling the agent-based model to a more robust hydrologic model may reduce some of these  
831 hydrologic limitations. The Agro-IBIS model, which includes dynamic crop growth and a crop

832 management module, would be particularly well suited to further investigating various farm-  
833 level decisions within an ABM on hydrologic outcomes (Kucharik, 2003).

834 From the agent-based modeling standpoint, the decision-making of the farmer and city  
835 agent could be made more sophisticated by introducing certain state variables, further decision  
836 components and longer planning horizons. Studies have identified variables such as farm size,  
837 type of farm, age of farmer, off farm income, land tenure agreement, education from local  
838 experts, among others, to be significant in determining adoption of conservation practices  
839 (Arbuckle, 2017; Daloğlu et al., 2014; Davis and Gillespie, 2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Mcguire  
840 et al., 2015; Ryan et al., 2003; Salatiel et al., 1994; Schaible et al., 2015). The functionality of the  
841 city agent could be expanded by introducing cost-benefit analysis capabilities. Cost-benefit  
842 capabilities would allow the city agent to make more advanced decisions such as choosing  
843 among a variety of flood reducing investments (Shreve and Kelman, 2014; Tesfatsion et al.,  
844 2017). The model is capable of replicating historical trends in observed conservation land in  
845 Iowa with a Pearson's  $r > 0.75$  and a  $MAE < 12.5\%$  for a select number of simulations;  
846 however, more work is needed to try to validate the model on a micro-level (farm-level) scale.  
847 Finally, future work should more fully explore the feedbacks from the hydrologic system to the  
848 human system, which is one of the strengths of the agent-based modeling approach (An, 2012).

#### 849 **Code Availability**

850 Model code can be obtained from the corresponding author.

851

852

853

854

855 **Author Contribution**

856 David Dziubanski and Kristie Franz were the primary model developers and prepared the  
857 manuscript. William Gutowski aided with manuscript preparation and editing.

858 **Competing Interests**

859 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

860 **Acknowledgments**

861 Funding for this project was provided by an Iowa State University College of Liberal Arts and  
862 Sciences seed grant. We would like to thank all other seed grant participants, including Jean  
863 Goodwin, Chris R. Rehmann, William W. Simpkins, Leigh Tesfatsion, Dara Wald, and Alan  
864 Wanamaker.

865 **References**

- 866  
867 Ahn, K. H. and Merwade, V.: Quantifying the relative impact of climate and human activities on  
868 streamflow, *J. Hydrol.*, 515, 257–266, doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.04.062, 2014.
- 869 An, L.: Modeling human decisions in coupled human and natural systems : Review of agent-  
870 based models, *Ecol. Modell.*, 229, 25–36, doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2011.07.010, 2012.
- 871 An, L., Linderman, M., Qi, J., Shortridge, A. and Liu, J.: Exploring Complexity in a Human–  
872 Environment System: An Agent-Based Spatial Model for Multidisciplinary and Multiscale  
873 Integration, *Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr.*, 95(1), 54–79, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.2005.00450.x,  
874 2005.
- 875 Arbuckle, J. G.: Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll 2016 Summary Report, Ames, IA., 2017.
- 876 Arbuckle, J. G., Morton, L. W. and Hobbs, J.: Understanding farmer perspectives on climate  
877 change adaptation and mitigation: the roles of trust in sources of climate information, climate  
878 change beliefs, and perceived risk, *Environ. Behav.*, 1–30, doi:10.1177/0013916513503832,

879 2013.

880 Asch, M., Boquet, M. and Nodet, M.: Nudging Methods, in *Data Assimilation: Methods,*  
881 *Algorithms, and Applications*, pp. 120–123, SIAM., 2017.

882 Axelrod, R. and Tesfatsion, L.: A Guide for Newcomers to Agent-Based Modeling in the Social  
883 Sciences, *Handb. Comput. Econ.*, 2, 1647–1659, doi:10.1016/S1574-0021(05)02044-7, 2006.

884 Di Baldassarre, G., Viglione, A., Carr, G., Kuil, L., Salinas, J. L. and Blöschl, G.: Socio-  
885 hydrology: Conceptualising human-flood interactions, *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.*, 17(8), 3295–  
886 3303, doi:10.5194/hess-17-3295-2013, 2013.

887 Barreteau, O., Bousquet, F., Millier, C. and Weber, J.: Suitability of Multi-Agent Simulations to  
888 study irrigated system viability: application to case studies in the Senegal River Valley, *Agric.*  
889 *Syst.*, 80(3), 255–275, doi:10.1016/j.agry.2003.07.005, 2004.

890 Becu, N., Perez, P., Walker, a, Barreteau, O. and Page, C. L.: Agent based simulation of a small  
891 catchment water management in northern Thailand, *Ecol. Modell.*, 170(2–3), 319–331,  
892 doi:10.1016/S0304-3800(03)00236-9, 2003.

893 Berger, T.: Agent-based spatial models applied to agriculture: A simulation tool for technology  
894 diffusion, resource use changes and policy analysis, *Agric. Econ.*, 25(2–3), 245–260,  
895 doi:10.1016/S0169-5150(01)00082-2, 2001.

896 Berger, T. and Troost, C.: Agent-based Modelling of Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Options  
897 in Agriculture, *J. Agric. Econ.*, 65(2), 323–348, doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12045, 2014.

898 Berger, T., Birner, R., Mccarthy, N., DíAz, J. and Wittmer, H.: Capturing the complexity of  
899 water uses and water users within a multi-agent framework, *Water Resour. Manag.*, 21(1), 129–  
900 148, doi:10.1007/s11269-006-9045-z, 2006.

901 Berglund, E. Z.: Using agent-based modeling for water resources planning and management, *J.*

902 Water Resour. Plan. Manag., 141(11), 1–17, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000544, 2015.

903 Bharathy, G. K. and Silverman, B.: Holistically evaluating agent-based social systems models: A  
904 case study., 2013.

905 Bithell, M. and Brasington, J.: Coupling agent-based models of subsistence farming with  
906 individual-based forest models and dynamic models of water distribution, Environ. Model.  
907 Softw., 24(2), 173–190, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2008.06.016, 2009.

908 Bonabeau, E.: Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating human systems,  
909 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., 99(3), 7280–7287, doi:10.1073/pnas.082080899, 2002.

910 Borrill, P. and Tesfatsion, L.: Agent-based modeling: the right mathematics for the social  
911 sciences?, in The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, pp. 228–258, New York,  
912 New York., 2011.

913 Brown, C. M., Lund, J. R., Cai, X., Reed, P. M., Zagona, E. A., Ostfeld, A., Hall, J., Characklis,  
914 G. W., Yu, W. and Brekke, L.: Scientific Framework for Sustainable Water Management, Water  
915 Resour. Res., 6110–6124, doi:10.1002/2015WR017114.Received, 2015.

916 Burton, R. J. F.: The influence of farmer demographic characteristics on environmental  
917 behaviour: A review, J. Environ. Manage., 135, 19–26, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.12.005,  
918 2014.

919 Chu, X. and Steinman, A.: Event and Continuous Hydrologic Modeling with HEC-HMS, J. Irrig.  
920 Drain. Eng., 135(1), 119–124, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9437(2009)135:1(119), 2009.

921 Claassen, R. and Tegene, A.: Agricultural Land Use Choice: A Discrete Choice Approach,  
922 Agric. Resour. Econ. Rev., 28(1), 26–36, doi:10.1017/s1068280500000940, 1999.

923 Cydzik, K. and Hogue, T. S.: Modeling postfire response and recovery using the hydrologic  
924 engineering center hydrologic modeling system (HEC-HMS), J. Am. Water Resour. Assoc.,

925 45(3), doi:10.1111/j.1752-1688.2009.00317.x, 2009.

926 Daloğlu, I., Nassauer, J. I., Riolo, R. L. and Scavia, D.: Development of a farmer typology of  
927 agricultural conservation behavior in the american corn belt, *Agric. Syst.*, 129, 93–102,  
928 doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2014.05.007, 2014.

929 Davis, C. G. and Gillespie, J. M.: Factors affecting the selection of business arrangements by  
930 U.S. hog farmers, *Rev. Agric. Econ.*, 29(2), 331–348, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9353.2007.00346.x,  
931 2007.

932 Du, E., Cai, X., Sun, Z. and Minsker, B.: Exploring the Role of Social Media and Individual  
933 Behaviors in Flood Evacuation Processes: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach, *Water Resour.*  
934 *Res.*, 53(11), 9164–9180, doi:10.1002/2017WR021192, 2017.

935 Duffy, M.: *Conservation Practices for Landlords*, Ames, IA., 2015.

936 Dziubanski, D. J., Franz, K. J. and Helmers, M. J.: Effects of Spatial Distribution of Prairie  
937 Vegetation in an Agricultural Landscape on Curve Number Values, *J. Am. Water Resour.*  
938 *Assoc.*, 53(2), 365–381, doi:10.1111/1752-1688.12510, 2017.

939 Elshafei, Y., Sivapalan, M., Tonts, M. and Hipsey, M. R.: A prototype framework for models of  
940 socio-hydrology: Identification of key feedback loops and parameterisation approach, *Hydrol.*  
941 *Earth Syst. Sci.*, 18(6), 2141–2166, doi:10.5194/hess-18-2141-2014, 2014.

942 Fagiolo, G., Windrum, P. and Moneta, A.: Empirical validation of agent-based models: A critical  
943 survey, *Econ. Policy*, (May), 1–45 [online] Available from:  
944 <http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2006-14.pdf>, 2006.

945 Fagiolo, G., Guerini, M., Lamperti, F., Moneta, A. and Roventini, A.: *Validation of Agent-Based*  
946 *Models in Economics and Finance BT - Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental*  
947 *Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by C. Beisbart

948 and N. J. Saam, pp. 763–787, Springer International Publishing, Cham., 2019.

949 Frans, C., Istanbuluoglu, E., Mishra, V., Munoz-Arriola, F. and Lettenmaier, D. P.: Are climatic  
950 or land cover changes the dominant cause of runoff trends in the Upper Mississippi River Basin?,  
951 *Geophys. Res. Lett.*, 40(6), 1104–1110, doi:10.1002/grl.50262, 2013.

952 Grimm, V., Berger, U., Bastiansen, F., Eliassen, S., Ginot, V., Giske, J., Goss-Custard, J., Grand,  
953 T., Heinz, S. K., Huse, G., Huth, A., Jepsen, J. U., Jørgensen, C., Mooij, W. M., Müller, B.,  
954 Pe'er, G., Piou, C., Railsback, S. F., Robbins, A. M., Robbins, M. M., Rossmanith, E., Rüger, N.,  
955 Strand, E., Souissi, S., Stillman, R. a., Vabø, R., Visser, U. and DeAngelis, D. L.: A standard  
956 protocol for describing individual-based and agent-based models, *Ecol. Modell.*, 198(1–2), 115–  
957 126, doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2006.04.023, 2006.

958 Guerini, M. and Moneta, A.: A method for agent-based models validation, *J. Econ. Dyn. Control*,  
959 82, 125–141, doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2017.06.001, 2017.

960 Gyawali, R. and Watkins, D. W.: Continuous Hydrologic Modeling of Snow-Affected  
961 Watersheds in the Great Lakes Basin Using HEC-HMS, *J. Hydrol. Eng.*, 18(January), 29–39,  
962 doi:10.1061/(ASCE)HE.1943-5584.0000591., 2013.

963 Hahn, H. A.: The conundrum of verification and validation of social science-based models,  
964 *Procedia Comput. Sci.*, 16, 878–887, doi:10.1016/j.procs.2013.01.092, 2013.

965 Halwatura, D. and Najim, M. M. M.: Environmental Modelling & Software Application of the  
966 HEC-HMS model for runoff simulation in a tropical catchment, *Environ. Model. Softw.*, 46,  
967 155–162, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2013.03.006, 2013.

968 Helmers, M. J., Zhou, X., Asbjornsen, H., Kolka, R., Tomer, M. D. and Cruse, R. M.: Sediment  
969 Removal by Prairie Filter Strips in Row-Cropped Ephemeral Watersheds, *J. Environ. Qual.*,  
970 41(5), 1531, doi:10.2134/jeq2011.0473, 2012.

971 Hernandez-Santana, V., Zhou, X., Helmers, M. J., Asbjornsen, H., Kolka, R. and Tomer, M.:  
972 Native prairie filter strips reduce runoff from hillslopes under annual row-crop systems in Iowa,  
973 USA, *J. Hydrol.*, 477, 94–103, doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.11.013, 2013.

974 Hoag, D., Luloff, A. E. and Osmond, D.: *How Farmers and Ranchers Make Decisions on*  
975 *Conservation Practices*, Raleigh, NC., 2012.

976 Hofstrand, D.: *Tracking the Profitability of Corn Production*, Ames, IA., 2018.

977 Jenkins, K., Surminski, S., Hall, J. and Crick, F.: Assessing surface water flood risk and  
978 management strategies under future climate change: Insights from an Agent-Based Model, *Sci.*  
979 *Total Environ.*, 595, 159–168, doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.03.242, 2017.

980 Knebl, M. R., Yang, Z., Hutchison, K. and Maidment, D. R.: Regional scale flood modeling  
981 using NEXRAD rainfall , GIS , and HEC-HMS / RAS : a case study for the San Antonio River  
982 Basin Summer 2002 storm event, *J. Environ. Manage.*, 75, 325–336,  
983 doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2004.11.024, 2005.

984 Kucharik, C. J.: Evaluation of a process-based agro-ecosystem model (Agro-IBIS) across the  
985 U.S. Corn Belt: Simulations of the interannual variability in maize yield, *Earth Interact.*, 7(14),  
986 1–33, doi:10.1175/1087-3562(2003)007<0001:EOAPAM>2.0.CO;2, 2003.

987 Kulik, B. and Baker, T.: Putting the organization back into computational organization theory: a  
988 complex Perrowian model of organizational action, *Comput. Math. Organ. Theory*, 14, 84–119,  
989 doi:10.1007/s10588-008-9022-6, 2008.

990 Lambert, D. M., Sullivan, P., Claassen, R. and Foreman, L.: Profiles of US farm households  
991 adopting conservation-compatible practices, *Land use policy*, 24(1), 72–88,  
992 doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2005.12.002, 2007.

993 Langevin, J., Wen, J. and Gurian, P. L.: *Simulating the human-building interaction:*

994 Development and validation of an agent-based model of office occupant behaviors, *Build.*  
995 *Environ.*, 88, 27–45, doi:10.1016/j.buildenv.2014.11.037, 2015.

996 Le, Q., Park, S. and Vlek, P.: Ecological Informatics Land Use Dynamic Simulator (LUDAS): A  
997 multi-agent system model for simulating spatio-temporal dynamics of coupled human –  
998 landscape system 2. Scenario-based application for impact assessment of land-use policies, *Ecol.*  
999 *Inform.*, 5(3), 203–221, doi:10.1016/j.ecoinf.2010.02.001, 2010.

1000 Macal, C. M., North, M. J., Cirillo, R., Koratorav, V., Thimmapuram, P. and Veselka, T.:  
1001 Validation of an Agent-based Model of Deregulated Electric Power Markets Abstract EMCAS  
1002 ( Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System ) is an agent-based simulation model of the  
1003 electric power market designed to investigate market restructuring and deregul. [online]  
1004 Available from:  
1005 <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/EmpValidACE.MacalNorth.ElectricPower.pdf>, 2007.

1006 Marcotty, J.: High crop prices a threat to nature?, *StarTribune*, 11th November, 2011.

1007 Matthews, R.: The People and Landscape Model (PALM): Towards full integration of human  
1008 decision-making and biophysical simulation models, *Ecol. Model.*, 194, 329–343,  
1009 doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2005.10.032, 2006.

1010 Mays, L.: *Water Resources Engineering*, 2nd ed., John Wiler & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ., 2011.

1011 McGuire, J., Morton, L. W. and Cast, A. D.: Reconstructing the good farmer identity: Shifts in  
1012 farmer identities and farm management practices to improve water quality, *Agric. Human*  
1013 *Values*, 30(1), 57–69, doi:10.1007/s10460-012-9381-y, 2013.

1014 McGuire, J. M., Wright, L., Arbuckle, J. G. and Cast, A. D.: Farmer identities and responses to  
1015 the social-biophysical environment, *J. Rural Stud.*, 39, 145–155,  
1016 doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2015.03.011, 2015.

1017 Montanari, A.: Debates-Perspectives on socio-hydrology: Introduction, *Water Resour. Res.*,  
1018 51(6), 4768–4769, doi:10.1002/2015WR017430, 2015.

1019 Naik, P. K. and Jay, D. a.: Distinguishing human and climate influences on the Columbia River:  
1020 Changes in mean flow and sediment transport, *J. Hydrol.*, 404(3–4), 259–277,  
1021 doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2011.04.035, 2011.

1022 Newton, J.: Change on the Horizon for the Conservation Reserve Program?, [online] Available  
1023 from: [https://www.fb.org/market-intel/change-on-the-horizon-for-the-conservation-reserve-](https://www.fb.org/market-intel/change-on-the-horizon-for-the-conservation-reserve-program)  
1024 [program](https://www.fb.org/market-intel/change-on-the-horizon-for-the-conservation-reserve-program) (Accessed 15 January 2018), 2017.

1025 Ng, T. L., Eheart, J. W., Cai, X. and Braden, J. B.: An agent-based model of farmer decision-  
1026 making and water quality impacts at the watershed scale under markets for carbon allowances  
1027 and a second-generation biofuel crop, *Water Resour. Res.*, 47(9), doi:10.1029/2011WR010399,  
1028 2011.

1029 Noel, P. H. and Cai, X.: On the role of individuals in models of coupled human and natural  
1030 systems : Lessons from a case study in the Republican River Basin, *Environ. Model. Softw.*, 92,  
1031 1–16, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2017.02.010, 2017.

1032 Nowak, P.: Why farmers adopt production technology, *Soil Water Conserv.*, 47(1), 14–16, 1992.

1033 van Oel, P. R., Krol, M. S., Hoekstra, A. Y. and Taddei, R. R.: Feedback mechanisms between  
1034 water availability and water use in a semi-arid river basin: A spatially explicit multi-agent  
1035 simulation approach, in *Environmental Modelling & Software*, vol. 25, pp. 433–443, Elsevier  
1036 Ltd., 2010.

1037 Ormerod, P. and Rosewell, B.: Validation and Verification of Agent-Based Models in the Social  
1038 Sciences, *Epistemol. Asp. Comput. Simul. Soc. Sci.*, 5466, 130–140, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-  
1039 01109-2\_10, 2009.

1040 Pahl-wostl, C. and Ebenhöf, E.: Heuristics to characterise human behaviour in agent based  
1041 models., 2004.

1042 Parker, D. C., Hessler, A. and Davis, S. C.: Complexity, land-use modeling, and the human  
1043 dimension: Fundamental challenges for mapping unknown outcome spaces, *Geoforum*, 39(2),  
1044 789–804, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.05.005, 2008.

1045 Parunak, H. V. D., Savit, R. and Riolo, R. L.: Multi-agent systems and agent-based simulation,  
1046 *Proc. First Int. Work. Multi-Agent Syst. Agent-Based Simul.*, 10–25, doi:10.1007/b71639, 1998.

1047 Pfrimmer, J., Gigliotti, L., Stafford, J. and Schumann, D.: Motivations for Enrollment Into the  
1048 Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program in the James River Basin of South Dakota, *Hum.*  
1049 *Dimens. Wildl.*, 22(4), 1–8, doi:10.1080/10871209.2017.1324069, 2017.

1050 Plastina, A.: *Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa - 2017*, Ames, IA., 2017.

1051 Prior, J.: *Landforms of Iowa*, 1st ed., University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, Iowa., 1991.

1052 Prokopy, L. S., Floress, K., Arbuckle, J. G., Church, S. P., Eanes, F. R., Gao, Y., Gramig, B. M.,  
1053 Ranjan, P. and Singh, A. S.: Adoption of agricultural conservation practices in the United States:  
1054 Evidence from 35 years of quantitative literature, *J. Soil Water Conserv.*, 74(5), 520–534,  
1055 doi:10.2489/jswc.74.5.520, 2019.

1056 Reeves, H. W. and Zellner, M. L.: Linking MODFLOW with an agent-based land-use model to  
1057 support decision making., *Ground Water*, 48(5), 649–60, doi:10.1111/j.1745-6584.2010.00677.x,  
1058 2010.

1059 Rogger, M., Agnoletti, M., Alaoui, A., Bathurst, J. C., Bodner, G., Borga, M., Chaplot, V.,  
1060 Gallart, F., Glatzel, G., Hall, J., Holden, J., Holko, L., Horn, R., Kiss, A., Quinton, J. N.,  
1061 Leitinger, G., Lennartz, B., Parajka, J., Peth, S., Robinson, M., Salinas, J. L., Santoro, A.,  
1062 Szolgay, J., Tron, S. and Viglione, A.: Land use change impacts on floods at the catchment scale:

1063 Challenges and opportunities for future research, *Water Resources Res.*, 53(June 2013), 5209–  
1064 5219, doi:10.1002/2017WR020723.Received, 2017.

1065 Rosengrant, M., Cai, X. and Cline, S.: *World water and food to 2025.*, 2002.

1066 Ryan, R. L., Erickson, D. L. and De Young, R.: Farmers' Motivation for Adopting Conservation  
1067 Practices along Riparian Zones in a Mid-western Agricultural Watershed, *J. Environ. Plan.*  
1068 *Manag.*, 46(1), 19–37, doi:10.1080/713676702, 2003.

1069 Saltiel, J., Bauder, J. W. and Palakovich, S.: Adoption of Sustainable Agricultural Practices:  
1070 Diffusion, Farm Structure, and Profitability, *Rural Sociol.*, 59(2), 333–349, 1994.

1071 Savenije, H. H. G. and Van der Zaag, P.: Integrated water resources management: Concepts and  
1072 issues, *Phys. Chem. Earth*, 33(5), 290–297, doi:10.1016/j.pce.2008.02.003, 2008.

1073 Schaible, G. D., Mishra, A. K., Lambert, D. M. and Panterov, G.: Factors influencing  
1074 environmental stewardship in U.S. agriculture: Conservation program participants vs. non-  
1075 participants, *Land use policy*, 46, 125–141, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.01.018, 2015.

1076 Scharffenberg, W. A.: *Hydrologic Modeling System User's Manual*, United State Army Corps  
1077 Eng. [online] Available from: [http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-](http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-hms/documentation/HEC-HMS_Users_Manual_4.0.pdf)  
1078 [hms/documentation/HEC-HMS\\_Users\\_Manual\\_4.0.pdf](http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-hms/documentation/HEC-HMS_Users_Manual_4.0.pdf), 2013.

1079 Schilling, K. E., Chan, K. S., Liu, H. and Zhang, Y. K.: Quantifying the effect of land use land  
1080 cover change on increasing discharge in the Upper Mississippi River, *J. Hydrol.*, 387(3–4), 343–  
1081 345, doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2010.04.019, 2010.

1082 Schlüter, M. and Pahl-wostl, C.: Mechanisms of Resilience in Common-pool Resource  
1083 Management Systems : an Agent-based Model of Water Use in a River Basin, *Ecol. Soc.*, 12(2)  
1084 [online] Available from: <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art4/>, 2007.

1085 Schmieg, S., Franz, K., Rehmann, C. and van Leeuwen, J. (Hans): Reparameterization and

1086 evaluation of the HEC-HMS modeling application for the City of Ames, Iowa, Ames, IA., 2011.

1087 Schreinemachers, P. and Berger, T.: Land use decisions in developing countries and their  
1088 representation in multi-agent systems, *L. Use Sci.*, 1(1), 29–44,  
1089 doi:10.1080/17474230600605202, 2006.

1090 Schreinemachers, P. and Berger, T.: An agent-based simulation model of human–environment  
1091 interactions in agricultural systems, *Environ. Model. Softw.*, 26(7), 845–859,  
1092 doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2011.02.004, 2011.

1093 Schwarz, N. and Ernst, A.: Agent-based modeling of the diffusion of environmental innovations  
1094 - An empirical approach, *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, 76(4), 497–511,  
1095 doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2008.03.024, 2009.

1096 Secchi, S. and Babcock, B. A.: Impact of High Corn Prices on Conservation Reserve Program  
1097 Acreage., *Iowa Ag Rev.*, 13(2), 4–7, 2007.

1098 Shreve, C. M. and Kelman, I.: Does mitigation save? Reviewing cost-benefit analyses of disaster  
1099 risk reduction, *Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct.*, 10, 213–235, doi:10.1016/j.ijdr.2014.08.004, 2014.

1100 Simon, H.: *Models of Man*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, New York., 1957.

1101 Sivapalan, M. and Blöschl, G.: Time scale interactions and the coevolution of humans and water,  
1102 *Water Resour. Res.*, 51(9), 6988–7022, doi:10.1002/2015WR017896, 2015.

1103 Sivapalan, M., Savenije, H. H. G. and Blöschl, G.: Socio-hydrology: A new science of people  
1104 and water, *Hydrol. Process.*, 26(8), 1270–1276, doi:10.1002/hyp.8426, 2012.

1105 Tannura, M. A., Irwin, S. H. and Good, D. L.: *Weather, Technology, and Corn and Soybean*  
1106 *Yields in the U.S. Corn Belt*. [online] Available from:  
1107 <http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/marketing/reports>, 2008.

1108 Tesfatsion, L., Rehmann, C. R., Cardoso, D. S., Jie, Y. and Gutowski, W. J.: An agent-based

1109 platform for the study of watersheds as coupled natural and human systems, *Environ. Model.*  
1110 *Softw.*, 89, 40–60, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2016.11.021, 2017.

1111 Tigner, R.: *Partial Budgeting: A Tool to Analyze Farm Business Changes*, Ames, IA., 2006.

1112 Tomer, M. D. and Schilling, K. E.: A simple approach to distinguish land-use and climate-  
1113 change effects on watershed hydrology, *J. Hydrol.*, 376(1–2), 24–33,  
1114 doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2009.07.029, 2009.

1115 Troy, T., Pavao-Zuckerman, M. and Evans, T.: Debates—Perspectives on socio-hydrology:  
1116 Socio-hydrologic modeling: Tradeoffs, hypothesis testing, and validation, *Water Resour. Res.*,  
1117 51, 4806–4814, doi:10.1002/2015WR017046, 2015.

1118 Tyndall, J. C., Schulte, L. A., Liebman, M. and Helmers, M.: Field-level financial assessment of  
1119 contour prairie strips for enhancement of environmental quality, *Environ. Manage.*, 52(3), 736–  
1120 747, doi:10.1007/s00267-013-0106-9, 2013.

1121 USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS): *National Engineering*  
1122 *Handbook, Part 630*, Washington, DC., 2004.

1123 USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS): *Field Office Technical Guide*,  
1124 [online] Available from: <http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/technical/fotg/>  
1125 (Accessed 9 April 2016), 2015.

1126 USDA: *Conservation Reserve Program*. [online] Available from:  
1127 [www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/crp](http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/crp), 2011.

1128 USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service: *2018 Iowa Agricultural Statistics*, Des Moines,  
1129 Iowa., 2018.

1130 Verma, A. K., Jha, M. K. and Mahana, R. K.: Evaluation of HEC-HMS and WEPP for  
1131 simulating watershed runoff using remote sensing and geographical information system, *Paddy*

1132 Water Environ., 8, 131–144, doi:10.1007/s10333-009-0192-8, 2010.

1133 Viglione, A., Di Baldassarre, G., Brandimarte, L., Kuil, L., Carr, G., Salinas, J. L., Scolobig, A.  
1134 and Bloßchl, G.: Insights from socio-hydrology modelling on dealing with flood risk - Roles of  
1135 collective memory, risk-taking attitude and trust, J. Hydrol., 518, 71–82,  
1136 doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.01.018, 2014.

1137 Vorosmarty, C. and Sahagian, D.: Anthropogenic Disturbance of the Terrestrial Water Cycle,  
1138 Bioscience, 50(9), 753–765, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1641/0006-  
1139 3568(2000)050[0753:ADOTTW]2.0.CO;2, 2000.

1140 Wainwright, J.: Can modelling enable us to understand the rôle of humans in landscape  
1141 evolution?, Geoforum, 39(2), 659–674, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.09.011, 2008.

1142 Wang, D. and Hejazi, M.: Quantifying the relative contribution of the climate and direct human  
1143 impacts on mean annual streamflow in the contiguous United States, Water Resour. Res., 47(9),  
1144 doi:10.1029/2010WR010283, 2011.

1145 Windrum, P., Fagiolo, G. and Moneta, A.: Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models:  
1146 Alternatives and Prospects, J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul., 10(2), 2007.

1147 Xiang, X., Kennedy, R. and Madey, G.: Verification and Validation of Agent-based Scientific  
1148 Simulation Models, Agent-Directed Simul. Conf., 47–55 [online] Available from:  
1149 [http://www.nd.edu/~nom/Papers/ADS019\\_Xiang.pdf](http://www.nd.edu/~nom/Papers/ADS019_Xiang.pdf), 2005.

1150 Yang, L. E., Scheffran, J., Süsler, D., Dawson, R. and Chen, Y. D.: Assessment of Flood Losses  
1151 with Household Responses: Agent-Based Simulation in an Urban Catchment Area, Environ.  
1152 Model. Assess., 23(4), 369–388, doi:10.1007/s10666-018-9597-3, 2018.

1153 Zenobia, B., Weber, C. and Daim, T.: Artificial markets : A review and assessment of a new  
1154 venue for innovation research, Technovation, 29, 338–350,

1155 doi:10.1016/j.technovation.2008.09.002, 2009.

1156 Zhang, H. L., Wang, Y. J., Wang, Y. Q., Li, D. X. and Wang, X. K.: The effect of watershed  
1157 scale on HEC-HMS calibrated parameters: A case study in the Clear Creek watershed in Iowa,  
1158 US, *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.*, 17(7), 2735–2745, doi:10.5194/hess-17-2735-2013, 2013.

1159 Zhou, X., Helmers, M. J., Asbjornsen, H., Kolka, R. and Tomer, M. D.: Perennial Filter Strips  
1160 Reduce Nitrate Levels in Soil and Shallow Groundwater after Grassland-to-Cropland  
1161 Conversion, *J. Environ. Qual.*, 39(6), 2006, doi:10.2134/jeq2010.0151, 2010.

1162 Zhou, X., Helmers, M. J., Asbjornsen, H., Kolka, R., Tomer, M. D. and Cruse, R. M.: Nutrient  
1163 removal by prairie filter strips in agricultural landscapes, *J. Soil Water Conserv.*, 69, 54–64,  
1164 doi:10.2489/jswc.69.1.54, 2014.

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

Variable	Description	Unit
$C_{t-1:t-X}$	Mean total amount of land allocated to conservation during the previous X years	Hectares
$D_{t-1}$	Previous year's conservation land decision	Hectares
$\delta C_{futures:Y}$	Conservation decision based on crop price projections for Y years into the future	Hectares
$\delta C_{profit:X}$	Conservation decision based on mean past profit of previous X years	Hectares
$\delta C_{cons}$	Conservation decision based on conservation goal	Hectares
$C_{neighbor}$	Weighted mean conservation land of the farmer agent's neighbors	Hectares
$Profit_{diff}$	Differences in profit between an acre of crop and an acre of conservation land	(\$/Hectare)
$Hectares_{tot}$	Total land owned by farmer agent	Hectares
$G_t$	Government agent conservation goal for the current year t	Hectares
$G_{t-1}$	Unfulfilled conservation land from the previous year's t-1 conservation goal	Hectares
$A_{tot}$	Total agricultural land in watershed	Hectares
$C_{tot}$	Total land currently in conservation	Hectares
$P$	Total conservation land to be added to the goal as a percentage of production land	Dimensionless
$P_{new}$	Variable describing change in conservation goal with flood damage	(1/\$)

1173

1174

1175

Table 1. Variables in farmer and city agent equations.

Agent Model Parameters	Description	Range
$W_{risk-averse}$	Weight placed on farmer agent's previous land use	0.0 - 1.0
$W_{futures}$	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on future crop price	0.0 - 1.0
$W_{profit}$	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on past profit	0.0 - 1.0
$W_{cons}$	Weight place on farmer agent's decision based on his/her conservation goal	0.0 - 1.0
$W_{neighbor}$	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on his/her neighbor's decisions	0.0 - 1.0
$Cons_{max}$	Farmer's conservation goal - used to describe the farmer's conservation-mindedness	0.0 - 0.1
$X$	Number of previous years a farmer agent takes into account for his/her land decision	1 - 5
$Y$	Number of future years a farmer agent takes into account for his/her land decision	5 - 10
$ConsGoal_{max}$	Conservation goal at maximum flood damage	0.0 - 0.1

1176

Table 2. Primary agent model parameters in decision-making equations.

1177

1178

Decision Scheme	Decision Weight				
	Conservation Goal	Futures	Past Profit	Risk Aversion	Neighbor
Conservation	<b>0.8</b>	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Future price	0.05	<b>0.8</b>	0.05	0.05	0.05
Past profit	0.05	0.05	<b>0.8</b>	0.05	0.05
Risk averse	0.05	0.05	0.05	<b>0.8</b>	0.05

1179

Table 3. Decision weighting scheme tested with each scenario.

1180

Model Inputs	Years	Unit
Historical Cash Rent	1970-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Federal Subsidies	2000-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Historical Production Costs	1970-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Historical Corn Prices	1970-2016	(\$/MT)
Precipitation	1970-2016	(mm/hr)

Table 4. Model Inputs.

1181